Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎148r] (299/380)

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the task—it would mean the continuance for a certain number of years of a
considerable drain upon our military and financial resources ; but it would be a
limited period only, and there would be the prospect at the end of a stable and
revitalised Persia, bound to ourselves by ties of genuine gratitude and goodwill.
If an alternative selection could be made—and the choice fell on a Power of sufficient
resources and capacity—we could stand aside with a good grace, safe in the
knowledge that no Power attempting to set the Persian house in order could dispense
with our support, or could afford to disregard our just claims and interests.
5.—Akabia.
(a) General.
37. As regards the Arabian peninsula generally, while we have no interests in
the interior and no means of effectively intervening there, we are vitally concerned in
the exclusion of all foreign influence from a country which lies on the main line of
approach to India. It is therefore an important desideratum that foreign Powers
should expressly recognise our predominant political interests there. What we want
to get established is a sort of Monroe Doctrine for Arabia. Existing treaties secure
our position from Koweit (see paragraph 44} to Maskat (as to which see paragraphs
3X-40) and from Maskat to Aden. In the Red Sea we have treaties with the Idrisi
Saiyid of Asir, which give us a measure of control over him and preclude the inter
vention of foreign Powers ; and we require similar arrangements with the Imam of
Sanaa and the Sheikh of Mavia. Our sole right to conclude such treaties should be
recognised by the Powers. The Hejaz stands on a different footing, and it is
doubtful whether we should attempt to claim any special rights or to impose any
limitations on the sovereign independence which has been promised to King Husain,
and which is of great importance in the eyes of all Moslems. The sanctity of the
country will to a great extent protect it from foreign intrusion, and for the rest we
must rely on our own watchfulness and energy. The interior of Arabia we should
let severely alone, undertaking no obligations for the maintenance of peace, except so
far as our treaty with Bin Saud of Nejd (see paragraph 42) obliges us to protect him
in case of aggression by a foreign Power.
(b) Maskat.
38. Our only international difficulty at Maskat is with France. It arises out of
two diplomatic instruments, viz.:—(l) the Franco-Maskat Commercial Treaty of
1844, and (2) the joint Anglo-French Declaration of 1802. It was under cover of
the former, which gave French subjects the right of complete freedom of trade at
Maskat except in regard to certain • specified articles, that French arms dealers
were enabled to make Maskat the centre of a thriving traffic in arms that spread
throughout the Middle East, and flooded the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India and
adjacent regions with modern rifles and ammunition. 'The position was rectified in
1914, when the French Government renounced the right of invoking, on behalf of
French citizens, the privileges conferred by the Treaty of 1844, in so far as they
might be opposed to local regulations for the control of the arms traffic. But the
Declaration of bS62, whereby Great Britain and France jointly guaranteed the
“ independence” of Maskat, still remains ; and so long as it remains our control over
the arms traffic must be regarded as lacking in completeness ; for our ability to keep
the Sultan of Maskat up to his engagements—on which everything depends—is clearly
qualified by an undertaking which, if we ever found it necessary to take strong
measures with His Highness, might afford the French Government plausible grounds
for objection.
39. The Declaration of 1802 is also attended with certain other inconveniences of
a more general character, as to which the following extract may be quoted from a
Despatch from the Government of India, dated the 29th September 1916:—
“ We have long felt that this Treaty is open to grave objection in that it gives
the French a position at Maskat and consequently in the Gulf which interferes
with our prescriptive rights in that region, and that further, as interpreted
in connection with the Bandar Jisseh case, it precludes our acquiring or
even leasing territory belonging to Maskat. Now, as His Majesty’s Govern
ment are aware, it may be at any time desirable on naval, commercial, or
administrative grounds for us to secure a portion of such territory either by
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