Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎147r] (297/380)

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that we should address them a note engaging ‘'not to support’ any demand on the
“ part of British subjects for irrigation works, railways, or any preferential rights for
“ commercial or industrial enterprises in Northern Afghanistan.” The demand was
an embarrassing one. The Amir had never accepted the Afghan section of the 1907
Convention, and would be suie to object to his country being made the subject of
further bargaining between the Russian Covernmcnt and ourselves. The mention of
“Northern Afghanistan”—as recalling the division of Persia into “spheres of
influence ”—was particularly unfortunate. The (juestion was still under discussion
when the war broke out, though the Russian Government had in the meantime agreed
to our signing the Tibetan Agreement, subject to an undertaking not to give effect to
the disputed clauses without a previous understanding with Russia. The Russian
Government revived the question of Northern Afghanistan in March 1915, but no
further discussion oh the subject took place.
20. The present position differs entirely from that of 1911. The Bolshevist
Government has formally denounced the Convention of 1907. Russia lias deserted
the Alliance, and will not (it is presumed) be represented at the Peace Conference at
all. It is doubtful whether any central Russian Government, whatever its ultimate
form, will ever again hold the territories adjoining Afghanistan, the possession of
which gave its predecessors an interest in irrigational and other questions in the
northern part of the Amir’s kingdom. The Amir has rendered invaluable services to
ourselves, and to the whole Allied cause, by his resolute adherence of neutrality
throughout the war. The case against action likely to be offensive to him, strong as it
was in 1914, is infinitely stronger at the present time. The question seems to call for
no immediate action. We must wait until there is a Russian Government with which
we can negotiate ; and then endeavour to get rid of the self-denying ordinance in
Tibet without the embarrassing conditions that the Tsar’s Government desired to impose
in 1914. The fact that the Bolshevists have denounced the treaty, which alone gave
Russia the right to impose conditions at all, will be a strong point in our favour.
30. Another Afghan question still outstanding with the Russian Government is
that of the status of certain islands in the river Oxus on the Russo-Afghan frontier.
The question is not an urgent one, and there seems no object in raising it in
connection with the peace negotiations.
31. It should be mentioned that we are pledged to the Amir not to bring up
questions affecting Afghanistan at the Peace Conference; and, if they are brought up
subsequently, as a sequel to the Conference, to agree to nothing without prior
reference to him.
4.—Persia.
32. The whole Persian question is so much in the melting-pot that, if it is to be
brought before the Peace Conference at all, it can presumably only be considered in
its broadest aspects. Such a question, for example, as Sir P. Cox’s recent proposal for a
“ mandate ” to Great Britain to undertake the reformation of Persia, might perhaps form
the subject of international discussion. But the international questions that exercised
our minds as recently as two years ago—the readjustment of the “ spheres of influence ”
prescribed by the Convention of 1907, the allocation of particular railway concessions,
and so forth-have disappeared with the disappearance of Russia. The Convention
is dead, and the “spheres of influence” no longer have any meaning. The
controversies to which they gave rise have for the time being been laid to rest and
need not be disturbed. There is, in fact, now that Russia is out of court, no one
with whom they could profitably be discussed. It is just conceivable that the Trans-
Persian railway project, in which French, as well as British and Russian, financial
interests were concerned, may be revived by the French Government. If so, Indian
interests require that the project should be firmly resisted. From the Indian point
of view there have always been the strongest possible objections to the scheme on
strategic grounds; and it was only the desire to stand well with Russia that induced
His Majesty’s Government before the war to proceed even as far as they did with its
examination.
33. It may be convenient to state briefly and in general terms the Indian aspect
of the Persian question. Persia lies across the most vulnerable flank of our Indian
position, and the defence of India must always bo the governing consideration in our