Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎146v] (296/380)

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(1) the cession of Chandernagore and (2) the abolition of the Loges. It is to be hoped
that these two desiderata may be secured without territorial compensation m l udk,
which is open to objection both in principle and practice, hut if this proves
impossible, a solution might be found on the lines of cession to France of territory
round Pondicherry, with the object of converting that settlement into one compact
area, in return for the surrender of all the other Settlements and of all I lench l ights
in the Loges. If required, definite proposals can be submitted as to the area to be
ceded to France in the Pondicherry region.
25. There is one other point in connection with French India that should lie
mentioned. Under a Treaty of 1815 (reciprocal in form) we enjoy special rights in
respect of the extradition of criminals from French India. 1 hese rights have in
practice largely fallen into desuetude. But importance is attached to their main
tenance in principle; and any attempt to include their abandonment in a bargain
over the cession of French territory should be resisted.
2.— Portuguese Possessions in India.
26. Portuguese possessions in India consist of three settlements (Goa, l)iu and
Daman), all situated in the Bombay Presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. . The elimination of Portuguese
territorial rights would be an administrative convenience; but it can hardly be put
higher. We should not be justified in paying a heavy price for its attainment. If
Portuguese jurisdiction disappeared, the question of the I cidvocido oi ecclesiastical
jurisdiction in British India, at present vested in the Poituguese Government, and
including certain rights in connection with the appointment of high Roman Catholic
dignitaries, would also have to be considered. It is very desirable that this juiis-
diction should be got rid of.
3.—Afghanistan and Tibet.
•
27. These two countries, which, with Persia, formed the subject of the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907, may conveniently be considered together. As regards
Tibet, the Convention of 1907" was largely in the nature of a “self-denying
ordinance,” under which both Great Britain and Russia undertook, iTitGV edict, to steek
no concessions in the country and to send no representatives to the Pibetan capital.
This act of self-abnegation was much greater on the part of. Great Britain than of
Russia, seeing that Tibet marches with the Indian Empire for many hundreds of
miles, whereas it is separated from Russia by a wide expanse of inhospitable
territory. In practice, while we have observed the letter of the Convention, we have
found it impossible to carry the policy of 1907 to its logical conclusion. The Tibetans
have not allowed us to disinterest ourselves in their affairs. Awakened to a desire for
progress from within and threatened by Chinese aggression from without, they have
tended more and more to turn to the Government of India for advice and assistance
in all their difficulties.
28. The ejection of the Chinese from Lhasa in 1912 was followed by a prolonged,
if somewhat desultory, campaign on the Sino-Tibetan frontier, which was only
terminated by a temporary truce concluded within the last few months. Shortly before
the great war, in response to repeated appeals from the Tibetans, and in order to
put an end to a situation that was growing intolerable, we offered our mediation to
effect a settlement between China and Tibet. The offer was accepted, and a
“ tripartite ” agreement was negotiated in India, only to be. rendered inoperative at
the last moment by the refusal of the Chinese delegate, under orders from Peking,
to sign the draft which he had previously initialled on his own authority. The
Agreement was, however, signed by the British and Tibetan representatives on the
3rd July 1914, and is valid as between ourselves and Tibet. Apart from the settle
ment with China, it contained provisions designed to place our own relations with
the Tibetans on a footing more in accord with actualities. These provisions affected
the Convention of 1907 at two points, viz., (1) it rendered necessary the rescission
of the “ self-denying ordinance ” in regard to concessions ; and (2) it contained a
clause giving the British Trade Agent at Gyantse the right of access to Lhasa
under certain conditions, thus conflicting with the undertaking in the Convention
not to send representatives to Lhasa. The Russian Government, to whom the
Agreement was submitted in May 1914, demanded, as the price of their acquiescence,