Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎54v] (108/348)

Those of us who have now been grappling with the problem of housing a ew
thousand refugees from Southern Russia cannot but be appalled at the prospect o
faced in the near future with the problem of accommodating and feeding tens ol
thousands of panic-stricken “ muhadjirs,” especially when we consider that one ot the
first results of nationalist opposition to our terms wdl be to cut us off fiom one o om
principal and nearest sources of supply.
As regards (c), it appears from the Foreign Office telegram that the Supreme
Council realise that the terms they propose must needs be imposed by force. 1 hey are
quite right. The terms are such that no Turk, Committee of Union and Progress or
pro-Entente can very well accept. The Supreme Council, thus, are prepared for a
resumption of general warfare ; they are prepared to do violence to their own declared
and cherished principles ; they are prepared to perpetuate bloodshed indefinitely in t le
Near East; and for what? To maintain M. Veniselos in power in Greece for what
cannot in the nature of things be more than a few years at the outside. ^ I cannot help
wondering if the game is worth the candle. I should wonder, even if M. Veniselos
were immortal ; he is not immortal, but ephemeral, and he is not only ephemeral, but,
as regards Greece, a phenomenon. By that I mean that he has no successors of his own
calibre. In other words, he is not Greece. He is not, strictly speaking, e^n Greek.
M. Veniselos’s deserts vis-d-vis the Entente are great; but is it wise to run the almost
certain risk of plunging Asia in blood in order to reward Greece according to the
deserts of M. Veniselos, which are very different from the deserts of Greece ?
I confess I am amazed at the apparent light-heartedness with which the Supreme
Council seem to contemplate another war, and with the apparent readiness of our
Government to provide its quota of men for the purpose. Recently,, when it was a
question of reoccupymg Baku and of defending our Indian marches, and eastern
Empire generally, against imminent Bolshevik menace, the project, one of, possibly
vital importance to the British Empire, had to be “ reluctantly abandoned because
the requisite troops could not be found. But when it is a question, not ot protecting
the Empire, but of gratifying the excessive demands of M. Veniselos, these difficulties
apparently vanish. This inconsistency may not be obvious to the British public, but I
think it would be to Allied officers and men out here, who will hardly appreciate being
called upon to sacrifice themselves in order to join Greeks in killing Turks.
The British people have been stirred, very rightly, by the recent massacre of between
10.000 and 15,000 Armenians in Cilicia. But at the same time they seem to be
contemplating with equanimity the entering into relations with the Bolsheviks—men
who have instigated the killing, flaying alive, and otherwise torturing of probably
hundreds of thousands of their own kith and kin. /-Rerhaps they do not realise that
the proposal to dimember Ottoman provinces of Turkey in the interests of Greece will
drive the remaining Turks into the arms of the Bolsheviks, will set the Near East and
Centra] Asia aflame, and will intensify the menace of Bolshevism to the British Moslem
world.
If the recent stiffening of the Supreme Council as regards Turkish terms is due to
the late events in Cilicia, I would say that it seems unsound policy to base what is
presumably intended to be a permanent settlement on an incident, the more so when
the fundamental responsibility for the incident is as yet far from established.
If, on the other hand, it is due to the thunder of the Canons of Canterbury, to the
outcry of Near Eastern cranks, and to the ingenious enthusiasm of Dr. Burrows and
his friends, it seems to me even less defensible.
It seems difficult to reconcile this undue severity towards the 1 urks, who are
believed to be weak, with the undue leniency to the far more unspeakable Bolsheviks,
who appear to be strong.
You will, I trust, excuse the length of this letter, but it is written with a strong
feeling that we are not acting quite with fairness and justification. Our good name is
at stake, and honesty of dealing is probably the greatest asset we have in the Near
East.
Believe me,
Yours sincerely,
J. M. de ROBECK.