Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎55r] (109/348)

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.}
EASTERN.
[July 10.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1,
[E 8098/1435/44] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan {Home)..,
( No - 643 -) n • & 7 7 in 1090
gj r July 10, 19^0.
DURING the Conference at Spa I had more than one conversation with the
Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, concerning the independent, and in some cases
scarcely loyal, attitude pursued by Italian officials, military officers and agents m
almost*' every part of the Near and Middle East. From every quarter, 1 said,
information'reached me of Italian intrigues with the Turkish Nationalists Italian
dissociation from Allied policy and interests, Italian attempts to make things difficult
for Allied and, in particular, British forces, representatives and actions. Irom a
confidential report which had recently come into my hands from Constantinople
extracted a number of specific incidents, of which 1 undertook to furnish Count bforza
with a more detailed resume. But from my own knowledge and recollection I was
able to refer him to examples of the sort of conduct of which I thought 1 had goo
reason to complain in the Caucasus, at Constantinople and more particularly m Egypt.
On two separate occasions, in London and at San Remo, the Italian I rime Minister
had promised to send an Italian battalion to reinforce the British garrison at Batoum,
which at that date it was an object of interallied policy to hold at any rate provisionally.
The French had carried out a similar undertaking, but the Italians had twice iaileu to
redeem their pledge. At Baku the different treatment meted out to the Italian
representative by the Bolsheviks as compared with the British and french and more
particularly the British, was an indication of the separate relations which the Italians
were known for some time to have established with the revolutionary paity. t
Constantinople the independent attitude of the Italians was so notorious that it was
a matter of common belief that the Alliance no longer existed, and the British
Commander-in-Chief was reluctant to make use of Italian troops in the military crisis
that had recently arisen because of his uncertainty as to their inclinations. Every
where the Italians were reported as assuring the Turks that they were behind them m
resisting the Turkish Peace Treaty, while in Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. we were credibly informed that
Italian agents were in close touch with the partisans of Mustafa Kemal.
I said to Count Sforza that I could understand a policy ot this description, which
might or might not be inspired by a regard for Italian interests, provided it was
pursued bv an independent, a neutral, or a hostile Power. But I could not understand
it so long "as it was pursued by a member of the Alliance which had fought and won the
war, which had continued since the war to meet the other Allies in friendly conference,
and which had only a few weeks ago on Italian soil drawn up the Peace treaty with
Turkey, against which the majority of these manoeuvres appeared to be directed. As
Ion" as the Alliance continued—and I was not aware that the Italians either desired oi
proposed its rupture—it seemed to me that the Allies were bound by the obligations
of a common loyalty to adhere to that policy, not only in the persons of their Ministers
and principals in Europe, but of their agents in all parts of the East.
Did the Italians, 1 asked, formally and seriously object to the terms ol the lurkish
Peace Treaty? Many reports had reached me to that effect, both at London and later
at San Remo ; and when we went to the latter place the British Delegation had been
led to expect that a serious attempt would be made by Italy to modify its conditions
in respect more especially of Smyrna and Thrace. It was true that Signor Nitti had
made a brief fight, or rather had raised some doubts, about the decision concerning
the Chatalja lines, and had shown no marked enthusiasm for the Smyrna solution.
But the Italian attitude had not been pushed to the point of opposition, and the treaty
in its present form had been finally accepted by them, not only without protest but
with unqualified assent. Did the Italian Delegation, I asked, adhere to this position,
or were they even now at Spa about to press for modification ?
Count Sforza admitted that his Government had felt, and continued to feel, very
serious doubts about the Thracian and Smyrna policy of the Allies, but he did not
anticipate that it would now be possible to modify it, and he accordingly accepted the
obligations of loyalty to a policy which he admitted to be equally binding upon his
Government with the remaining Allied Powers.
[3808 fc—1]