Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎54r] (107/348)

(This Document is tht Property of His Bntaamc Maj esty s Governm entj
Printed for the Cabinet. March 1J)20.
SECRET.
I THINK that I ought to circulate to my colleagues the following frank but
exceedingly important letter which I have just received from our High Commissioner
at Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck, concerning the terms of the proposed Peace
Treaty with Turkey. There is a paper issued by the General Staff at the War
Office on the same subject, which I have asked them to circulate also..
C. of K.
Foreign Office, S.W. 1,
March 26, 1920.
British High Commission, Constantinople,
My dear Lord Curzon, March 9, 1920.
The Foreign Office telegram of the 6th March containing the basis of the peace
with Turkey decided upon by the Supreme Council has, I confess, come somewhat as a
surprise. With two of the proposed terms, namely, the internationalisation of the
Straits and the imposition of a close financial control on Turkey, I am in entire agree
ment. But the proposed cession to Greece of all Thrace up to the Chatalja lines and
of Smyrna (which is hardly mitigated by the retention of a nominal and probably
valueless Turkish suzerainty) fills me with grave misgivings.
I have always maintained that the class which is responsible for having brought
Turkey into th* j war, and for the hideous massacres which took place durinor the war,
should receive drastic punishment. It is eminently right and proper that Turkey should
forfeit control of the Straits, should lose all non-Ottoman provinces, should have her
military element reduced to impotence, and should in general be disrated from the
position of a Great Power. But I feel equally strongly that the terms to be imposed on
Turkey should—
{a.) Not be incompatible with the principles for which we are supposed ro have
gone to war ;
(b.) Should pave the way for a lasting peace in the Near East;
(cJ Should be feasible of application without further bloodshed and sacrifices on
the part of the Allies.
These views are shared by my advisers here, men for the most part with life-long
experience of Near Eastern affairs.
If we apply these three tests to the proposed cession of Smyrna and Thrace to
Greece, what do we find ? As regards (a) it means that we are placing territories
overwhelmingly Turkish in population under the rule of the Turks’ secular enemies,
under whose rule previous experience in Thessaly, Crete and Macedonia has shown that
it is almost impossible for Mussulmans to exist--a flagrant violation of the principle of
self-determination, to which I was under the impression that the Supreme Council had
given its adherence. As regards (6), it is unthinkable, as the Foreign Office has
consistently been informed by us here, that the Mussulmans in those areas will peacefully
accept Greek annexation, especially after the sample of Greek methods which they have
had since the Greek occupation of Smyrna. This is made clear enough by the report of the
Inter-Allied Commission on the Smyrna atrocities, but clearer still by the very existence
of the nationalist movement in Asia Minor. If the provisional Greek occupation of
Smyrna has been, as it undoubtedly has, the canker in the Near Eastern situation since
last May, how much more so will definite annexation be the canker for years to come,
the constant irritant which will perpetuate bloodshed in Asia Minor probably for
generations ? Tim position of Thrace is analogous, but there is this further consideration,
that the notification of its annexation to Greece, or at least the first approach of a
Greek force, will almost certainly be the signal for a stampede of the non-combatant
Mussulman population.
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