Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎118v] (236/290)

Turning to Enzeli, he said, that the Note to the Cabinet asking
for a decision as to the policy of bluff which had been dictated to
Norperforce was really put forward ns a test case. the Cabinet
decision permitted the employment of British military forces in
defence of Persian interests. He noticed that General Dickson had
already explained to the Persian Prime Minister the role he was
instructed to play, and he saw no reason why a communication in the
same sense should not be made to the Persian Government. He
also agreed with the Chairman that they should be encouraged m
every way to set their own house in order and to organise their own
defence, even if this involved a slight increase in the amount paid
by them towards the Military Commission. The War Office were
prepared to assist in every way possible.
With regard to the Caspian, he said that the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff had not been convinced by the arguments oi
Colonel Stokes, and was not prepared to modify his view. The War
Office considered that if we were to wrest the command of the
Caspian from the Bolsheviks, the natural tendency would be for them
to attack our line of communications between Batoum and Baku.
He pointed out that the difficulty which the War Office would
experience in providing forces necessary for the defence of this line
had been greatly increased by recent developments in Germany, the
demands on our man-power being now greater than ever.
The War Office adhered to their policy of withdrawing from
Pars. The withdrawal was to commence on the 1st April and the
troops involved numbered about 3,000.
With regard to General Starosselski, he said that the War
Office had alwavs regarded him as a danger, and that the existence
of the Cossack Division was one of the main reasons for the retention
of Norperforce given in the recent Note to the Cabinet, they would
lather risk the possible trouble which would be caused by the
disbandment or reduction of the Cossack Division than the trouble
which would almost certainly result from their remaining in being.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he repeated his con
viction that the menace of Bolshevik military operations on a great
scale was greatly exaggerated. He thought that there was no real
threat to Enzeli, where Norperforce should have no difficulty
in retaining their position. The real danger from the Bolsheviks,
was internal trouble in Persia which they were past masters
at fomenting. The force on the lines of communication between
Hamadan and Enzeli consisted of four infantry battalions, one
cavalry regiment, one battery and a few machine guns, totalling
from 5,000 to 6,000 men.
The Chairman remarked that great attention had been paid by
the Cabinet to the cost of these forces. Their retention had only
been sanctioned for six months, though the War Office ha'l been
given the option of spreading six months’ expenditure over a vear if
they preferred to do so. He asked how this would work out (
General Raddiffe said that this Cabinet decision applied not
only to the forces on the Hamadan-Enzeli line, but also to the whole
garrison of Mesopotamia.
The War Office were in communication with the General
Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, on the subject, and his reply was
awaited. He pointed out that the retention of the troops on this
line would be impossible unless the Hamadan Road were put in
order, and referred to a recent communication from the Foreign
Office, in which the War Office proposal for work on this road had
been rejected.
The Chairman explained that at the same time that the War
Office had been supporting the proposed expenditure on the Hamadan
Road in an able and convincing manner, the Secretary of State had
argued against it in the Cabinet with equal force. The Secretary