Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎118r] (235/290)

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Meshed force. The withdrawal of even 500 men from Meshed would
be regarded locally as an indication that His Majesty’s Government
were about to withhold their support from the Persian Government
in Khorasan.
Sir William Duke mentioned that he had recently seen a private
letter from Colonel Bailey, who had just escaped from Tashkent, in
which he pointed out that the expense of maintaining a force which
was situated 500 miles from Seistan and 1,000 miles from Quetta
increased in a kind or geometrical progression in proportion to the
length of the line. This was due to the fact that a large number of
camels had to be employed merely to carry grain and fodder for
themselves and for other camels.
With regard to General Starosselski, he said that the. Secretary
of State’s Council were vehemently opposed to the continuance of
the subsidy. The Government of India had been asked exactly how
much they were prepared to pay towards the maintenance of British
military forces in North-East Persia. The “ normal proportion
referred to by the Chairman worked out at, roughly, one-sixth of
the total expenditure.
The Chairman said that the situation would be gravely
complicated if the Government of India were to take the line that
General Malleson was at Meshed primarily for the benefit of the
Imperial Government, and that their interest in his retention should
only be fixed at one sixth. Ic would assist him very much in putting
the case before the Cabinet if he could say that the Government
of India were interested to the extent of 50 per cent.
Sir William Duke hoped that the Government of India might
agree to pay more than the one-sixth. He suggested that matters
would be eased if the total expenditure could be reduced to one-half
of its present figure, and if the Government of India would then
consent to bear one‘-half of the reduced total. At the same time it
was undeniable that the Government of India were faced with
increased expenditure in many directions, and he could not of course
guarantee that they would take this line.
General Radcliffe said that the War Office could not defend the
retention of General Malleson’s force on purely military grounds, and
would prefer that it should be withdrawn at least to Birjand. The
Chief of the Imperial General Staff was, however, quite prepared to
maintain it for political purposes if it were decided that its retention
was desirable.
The question really resolved itself into the competing claims of
finance and policy, on which the War Office had an open mind.
Replying to a question by the Chairman he said that the portion of
expenditure chargeable to Imperial revenues fell on the War Office
Vote, and they were naturally reluctant to spend money on anything
which was not absolutely necessary. He thought that they would
be prepared to agree to the proposals in the Viceroy’s telegram of the
21st February, provided that no line of communications was required
for the support of the consular escort at Meshed and Seistan.
General Cobbe said that the proposal was that these escorts
should return to the pre-war basis by which they required no line of
communications. He added that the adoption of the Viceroy’s pro
posals as they stood was open to the objection pointed out by the
Chairman that any withdrawal of troops from Meshed itself would be
regarded as a step towards deserting them.
General Raddi-ffe said that the War Office did not anticipate
any formidable military effort on the part of the Bolsheviks. They
were adepts at propaganda and at causing disaffection by means of
secret agents, and were, he thought, likely to continue these methods
behind any such line of defence as was proposed by Sir Percy Cox.
The only "real way to defeat these methods was by a system of
counter espionage, which would be very difficult to set up.
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