Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎119r] (237/290)

7
of State had made no sort of defence for the retention of British
forces in North-West Persia, and had been inclined to throw the
responsibility on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
General Eaddiffe remarked that the War Office letter referred
to had been passed by the Secretary of State, who had regarded the
acceptance of the Cabinet decision that the force in North-West
Persia should be retained as involving the upkeep of the Hamadan
Road.
Mr. OH pliant said that the Foreign Office had supported the
War Office view to the Treasury that the cost of this road should
be borne on army funds, but had not yet received a reply. I he
Persian Railways Syndicate were not prepared to undertake the
road, but only the railway. He understood, however, from Prince
Fm^z that Messrs. Richards, Thynne & Co. might be prepared to
undertake the road if they were asked to do so. The sum involved
was somewhere between 300,COOL and 400,000b
Captain Goode said that the First Sea Lord was emphatic in
maintaining his attitude that British naval personnel should not be
sent to the Caspian unless Baku were held by the army and the
line of communication via Batoum were secured. Colonel Stokes had
informed him that there were 60,000 men in Baku who would be
quite ready to join the Bolsheviks if they thought that their oil
trade with the Volga would be cut off as a result of the command of
the Caspian being in our hands. The amount of oil carried by the
Batoum pipe-line was infinitesimal compared with that which
normally found an outlet towards the Volga.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he said that as soon
as the Volga was open the Bolsheviks must be expected to take
possession of Denikin’s fleet and thus to secure the command of the
Caspian. He did not think that they would attack Baku, provided
that the Azerbaijan Republic would give them oil, which was what
they really wanted.
The Chairman observed that if the Bolsheviks found that they
could get all the oil they wanted from Baku they would be still less
likely to embark on the hazardous adventures which they were said
to be contemplating in Persia. There was no doubt that they would
welcome any opportunity of embarrassing His Majesty’s Government,
but they could not really be anxious to leave their bones on the
Persian deserts, and it occurred to him that we might strike a
bargain with them. We had recently decided to reopen trade
relations with the co-operative societies. This was clearly
tantamount to opening trade relations with the Soviet Government,
without whose sanction the co-operative societies would be unable
to function. When Krassin—the Geddes of Russia—came to
London to discuss the question of rolling-stock, he did not see why
we should not take the following line with him. We coukf say that
we intended to assist the co-operative societies, and thus indirectly
the Soviet Government, to rebuild the material wealth of Russia.
We could not be expected to do this if the Soviet Government were
at the same time attacking us through Persia. It was true that the
employment of these arguments was a tacit recognition of the Soviet
Government, but this tacit recognition had already been accorded by
the opening of trade relations with the co-operative societies. We
could not afford to be too particular, and should, he thought, be
perfectly frank. •
Sir William Duhe remarked that the Acting Secretary of State
for India, at the time wdien the draft telegram to Lord Chelmsford
on the subject of General Malleson’s Mission was being prepared,
had emphasised the desirability of an open peace with the Soviet
Government. He did not therefore anticipate that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
would offer any objection to the course proposed hy the Chairman.
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