Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎106v] (212/290)

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difficulty in invading Khorasan and forcing General Malleson to-
withdraw to Birjand. This would mean that the whole of North-
East Persia would be given up to the Bolsheviks. He did not know
to what extent this would be regarded by the Persians as a failure
on our part to carry out the terms of the Anglo-Persian Agreement,
by which he understood that we were morally hound to assist the
Persians against Bolshevik aggression. Nor did he know to what
extent a successful invasion of Khorasan would have the result of
turning the whole of Persia Bolshevik.
Reverting to the Caucasus, and replying to questions by the
Chairman, he said that if the Caucasian States threw in their lot
with the Bolsheviks they would not add much to the military value
of the Bolshevik forces, as they did not appear to have any very
great potentialities from a military point of view. On the other
hand, this meant that if we supported them we could not expect
them to be of great military value to usv against the Bolsheviks.
The fighting would have to be done by ourselves, and if the
Bolsheviks turned on us in force, two divisions would not be
sufficient to stem the tide. He thought, however, that as long as
General Denikin was in being we ought to give such moral and
material support to the Caucasian Republics as would not entirely
preclude the possibility of his recovering, and once again making
headway against the enemy.
The Chairman pointed out that it must be remembered that, as
things turned out, a considerable proportion of the support which
we had already given to Koltchak and Denikin had, as a matter of
fact, fallen into the hands of Lenin. Was there not a danger that
similar support now given to the Republics would also go to swell
the resources of the Bolsheviks ?
Mr. Winston Churchill observed that if Bolshevik pressure in
the Caucasus really materialised, we w^ould lose all control from a
military point of view. If, however, we had any intention of
employing two divisions they had much better be given to Denikin
with the idea of encouraging the dwindling force which still followed
his banner.
We had been trying to bridge a twelve-foot gap with a ten-foot
plank, and when this was found to be inadequate a ten-foot six plank
had been substituted as a great concession. The only chance of
reinvigorating the Russian elements which were opposed to
Bolshevism was to support one or more of them so vigorously that
the rest would all take heart and renew the struggle.
The Chairman remarked that so long as Denikin and Koltchak
were in being and were being supported by the Allies the Bolsheviks
had been bound to fight them, as they were an active menace which
could not be disregarded. He was not sure, however, if the same
held good for the Caucasus. If the Caucasian Republics saw that
there was no prospect of active resistance and offered to make terms
he did not see why the Bolsheviks should necessarily send a military
expedition into that area.
General Thwaites pointed out that the Bolsheviks might quite
possibly aim at reoccupying the whole of what used to be acknow
ledged as the Russian sphere of influence in Persia and old Russian
territory in Trans-Caucasia.
Mr. Winston Churchill agreed that it was quite possible that
the Bolsheviks would not turn to the Caucasus, but it must not be
forgotten that in the present state of Russia the army was only safe
so long as it was actually employed. He himself thought that they
were more likely to turn on Poland than on the Caucasus. But in the
meanwhile the situation in the areas under discussion would rapidly
degenerate. The sipall parties of Allied troops which were now' in
these regions would gradually have to be withdrawn, though it was