Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎106r] (211/290)

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Tlie holding of eithier of the first two alternative lines would mean
that these threatening elements were in our rear. The third
alternative would mean the eventual loss of both North-East and
North-West Persia, but this was unavoidable.
r J he War Office were anxious that Batum ■should be evacuated.
Its occupation served no useful military purpose. Denikin was retiring,
and might or might not be pushed back against the Caucasus. If this
were to happen, effective support of the Georgian and Azerbaijan
Republics would need two divisions, which we had not got. Even
these two divisions would not be enough if the Bolsheviks determined
to attack in force. We must come back to our railheads, and the
eventual withdrawal to the line indicated in the third alternative
would give us the military advantage of a right flank guarded hy
the desert regions of Persia, across which an attacking army would
have great difficulty in advancing. He wished to make it clear that
there was no immediate intention of withdrawing our troops now in
North Persia.
Jn reply to the Chairman, he said that the brigade in Batum
was not at present in actual danger, but the War Office were very
anxious to avoid the possibility of this force finding itself in the
position in which the French had recently found themselves at
Odessa. Their withdrawal in such circumstances as these could
only be carried out under very disgraceful conditions. From the
military point of view it seemed better that the Republics should
•come to terms with the Bolsheviks. We should have no difficulty
in withdrawing the Batum garrison in view of our command of the
Black Sea, but it was desirable that if they were withdrawn this
should be done before we appeared to be compelled to evacuate
them.
Mr. Winston Churchill pointed out that General Holman’s
mission would also have to be withdrawn. It was at present with
Denikin, and the moment of its withdrawal would give the final
death-blow to Denikin’s hopes. The difficulty was to decide at what
moment we were to disentangle ourselves ; the more we put it off,
the more difficult it would be. If we left it to the last moment we
might find ourselves embarking the mission and carrying it away
into safety while its Russian comrades were left to be massacred on
the beach.
Sir Henry Wilson, replying to questions by the Chairman, said
that the chief difficulty in the way of retaining some measure of
command of the Caspian through Enzeli would be the difficulties of
transport through Persia and the lack of oil. Fie agreed that the
loss of the Caspian was a first-class disaster, and would almost
certainly have the result that the Caucasian Republics would throw
in their lot with the Bolsheviks, but it was physically impossible for
us to prevent this. We simply had not got the men to enable us to
hold the line of communications which would be essential for the
command of the Caspian.
Replying to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, he said that at the time when
we did actually hold the line outlined in alternative (a) we employed
one-and-a-half divisions for the purpose; but it must not be
forgotten that the Volunteer Army was in being as a butter between
us and the enemy.
General Thwaites pointed out that the Bolsheviks were in
considerable superiority to Denikin, who was not adequately
equipped to resist them. On the Transcaspian side all reports
indicated that from 70,000 to 80,000 Bolsheviks were collecting.
Their line of support was along the Tashkent and Orenberg Railway.
Sir Henry Wilson, replying to a question by Lord Hardinge,
agreed that the Bolshevik forces in Transcaspia would have great
difficulty in leaving the railway line, and would not be able to
invade Persia in any large numbers, but they would have no great
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