Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎107r] (213/290)

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true that no critical military situation was to be apprehended. It
the Cabinet and the Supreme Council decided that either of* the
lines in alternatives (a) and (b) was to be defended, it could, of
course, be done.
Sir Henry Wilson, replying to questions by the Chairman and
Mr. Winston Churchill, said that if British troops alone were to be
employed, he would be sorry to have to hold either of these lines
with less than seven divisions. If the defending force was to be a
mixed force of British and Allies, a larger total would be required.
It was impossible to form any estimate of the total figure of such a
mixed force, as the difficulty of maintenance would increase in
proportion to the increase in numbers. It was his considered
opinion that, from a military point of view, the defence of these
regions was impracticable. If anything approaching the force which
would be required for their defence was to be employed either by
the British Government or by the Allies, it would be more usefully
employed in aggressive action nearer to the heart of the danger.
His personal view was that if he were offered a force of this size he
would use it for a direct offensive on Moscow through Poland.
Mr. Winston Churchill said that he wished to make it quite
clear that no immediate withdrawal of our troops in the Caucasus
was contemplated. Such a withdrawal would definitely commit us
to deserting the remnants of Denikin’s force. It had been repre
sented to him that the Kuban Cossack area offered a possible refuge
to Denikin, where he might be able to defend himself and recruit
his forces. It was, of course, possible that he might collapse
altogether. He had tried to hold the line of the Don and had failed.
If it was clear that he was really going to collapse, we should of
course ha ve to withdraw our mission and our force at Batum ; but
we did not want to compromise his last chance and to remove what
was unquestionably a shield between us and the danger which
threatened to overwhelm our spheres of interest in the East.
Major McDonell said that the Azerbaijan and Georgian Govern
ments were very friendly, but that there was a Bussian working
population in Baku of some 80,000 with strong Bolshevik tendencies
and evidence of* a considerable pan-Turanian under-current among
the Mohammedans. If these Republics were left fo themselves, and
open to attack, Georgia would probably turn Bolshevik in self-
defence, while Azerbaijan would be forced to throw in her lot with
the pan-Turanian parties.
Sir Osmond Brock said that the Admiralty understood that,
from the point of view of the oil resources of Baku and of the threat
to the Persian oilfields, we could not allow the Caspian to become a
Bolshevik lake. Command of* the Caspian could not be maintained
without co-operation by land, as a base at Baku was essential.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he said the Bolsheviks
could do nothing till the middle of April, but after then they could
bring destroyers right down from the Baltic. They were under
stood to have only a,bout six destroyers available, and the moral of
the crews was not at all good. British naval personnel in command
of* Denikin’s fleet could hold the Caspian against them. He had
recently discussed the naval situation with Commodore Norris, who
had just returned from there, and he was of opinion that all that
would be necessary was the provision of a few 6-inch guns to improve
the armament of the ships. We had had no difficulty in retaining
command of the Caspian during the summer of 1919.
The Chairman said that what took place, six or nine months ago
was not necessarily a guide for the future. It was to be anticipated
that the recent marked improvement in the moral and leadership
of the Bolshevik army would be paralleled by a similar improvement
in their naval forces.