Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎105v] (210/290)

agreed to by the Supreme Council in Paris. He drew attention
to the more important telegrams which had lately been received in
the Foreign Office, notably that of the 11th January from Sir leicy
Cox, which gave the views of the Persian Prime Minister, from the
political point of view it was not only Persian sentiment that had to
he considered, but also Afghan. The vital importance of Afghanistan
as a factor in the situation had been pointed out at the last meeting
of the Conference.
The Chairman said that, at a recent discussion, the Cabinet had
asked the naval and military authorities to prepare an appreciation
of the commitments which would be involved in the holding of the
Caspian. He suggested that tne War Office and Admiralty repre
sentatives should inform the Conference of the conclusions arrived at
before the points raised in Lord Curzon’s telegram were discussed in
detail. In reply to a suggestion from Mr. Winston Churchill that
before the Chief of the Imperial General Staff made a statement on
these lines, he would like to know what were considered by the
Foreign Office to be the political desiderata, as it appeared to him
that the discussion must necessarily be based on these, he said that
the broad outline given by Lord Hardinge seemed to him to provide
the necessary focus for the discussion. He understood that the
political object was to keep the Caucasian liepublics free from
Bolsheviks as far as possible, in order that they might provide a
barrier for the protection of Persia, and thus, indirectly, of India and
Mesopotamia, from actual contact with the Bolshevik forces.
Sir Henry Wilson said that the Bolshevik threat to India and
Mesopotamia had been carefully considered for many weeks by the
military authorities. They had arrived at the conclusion that, from
the military point of view, there were three alternative lines on
which a possible advance of the Bolsheviks might be met: —
(a.) Constantinople, Batum, Baku, Krasnovodsk, and Merv.
This would entail command of the Black Sea and the Caspian.
For holding the line from Batum to Baku, two divisions would be
required, and for holding that from Krasnovodsk to Merv five more.
(b.) Constantinople, Batum, Baku, Enzeli, Teheran, and Meshed.
This would entail complete command of the Black Sea, but not
necessarily complete command of the Caspian. If Baku were held
it would be possible to deny command of the Caspian to the
Bolsheviks, and by holding the oil resources to cripple them seriously
in their operations.
The holding of this second line would require the same number
of troops as the first alternative, i.e., two divisions from Batum to
Baku, and five divisions from Baku to Meshed,
Before describing the third alternative line, he wished to say
that the War Office had definitely ruled out alternatives (a) and
(6) as being impossible with the means at their disposal. We had
not got seven divisions, nor was there any prospect of our being able
to find them. Even if they could be found, their maintenance and
reinforcement in these almost inaccessible regions would demand
transport facilities which were not in existence and could not be
procured.
(c.) Northern Palestine, Mosul, some point about 100 or 50
miles from Khaniqin. The force at Meshed, if and when
attacked, to fall back upon Birjand,
This was the outside of what we could do. It was not even
certain that we would be able to retain Mosul, but this point was
still under consideration. We had to contemplate the possibility
of a Peace settlement which would leave the Turk dissatisfied and
hostile, the Kurd restless and unquiet, and the Afghan unfriendly.