Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎100r] (199/290)

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the Russians advanced by way of Afghan-Turkestan, it was essential
for the protection of our ally, the Amir, that we should reach Kabul
before they did. As matters stood at present, we were not in a
position to say whether the present Amir was our ally or not. With
regard to the defence of Persia, the position in Khorasan was
analogous to that on the North-West of Persia. Here we had estab
lished a line from Baghdad to Kazvin with the object of preventing
hostile elements from invading Persia on the west. Malleson occupied
a similar position on the north-east. The protection of Persia was at
present a British interest as much as a Persian. He had little doubt
that General Malleson would have t^s tay in Meshed for some time,
possibly for one or two years, and, if this were so, it might be
desirable that the railway should be extended to Neh.
Mr. Montagu said that all military operations were at present
paid for by Imperial revenues. If India had been solely concerned
she would have withdrawn General Malleson, and the question of
the extension of the railway would consequently not have arisen.
He thought that any expenditure involved in the retention of
General Malleson ought to be shared between the Imperial and
Indian revenues on the well-known principle of the division of
expenditure in Persia.
Mr. Winston Churchill said that the possibility of changes in
the Russian situation must not be lost sight of. If the Bolsheviks
made it up with the Baltic States, they would then be free to turn
with all their forces against Denikin. It was only reasonable to
expect that, if they did this, Denikin would either be destroyed or
reduced to the position of a guerilla leader. It must not be forgotten
that early next year the Bolsheviks would be the largest organised
army in Europe. Where would they turn ? It was of course
possible that they might turn on the Baltic States in the hope of
consolidating their position in the same way as the Jacobins had
done in the time of Napoleon. On the pther hand, it seemed to
him likely that their whole weight and pressure would develop
against British interests in the regions which the Conference was
now discussing. We must anticipate great and increasing military
pressure preceded by active and virulent propaganda. We could not
expect the ruthless Jews, who were making use of the Bolshevik
movement, to stay their hand. They would certainly go further
afield. How much did this matter to India, and how much to
British interests in Persia ? So far, we had only felt the first few
drops of the storm : these people could easily make themselves masters
of the whole of this vast region if they liked, and could find in it a
secure retreat from which no one could dislodge them. Bokhara
would be the first state to succumb. The Bolsheviks would then
be in immediate contact with Afghanistan, and we could not say to
what extent Afghans and Bolsheviks would work together.
The Chairman remarked that it was not to the interests of
Afghanistan to see the Moslem state of Bokhara crushed out. The
present Amir’s grandfather had always lamented the departed days
when Afghanistan was the focus of Islam in Central Asia. If he had
not been crushed between Russia and ourselves, he would have
been a Tamerlane of a peculiarly aggressive and dangerous type.
The present young ruler, headstrong and unbalanced, was, it was
true, making temporary use of the Bolsheviks, but his interests
really lay with the Moslem states, Bokhara, Khiva, and even with
Shiah Persia. His policy was not essentially a Bolshevik policy.
^The whole of Mr. Churchill’s argument appeared to him to support
the contention that immediate measures should be taken to counteract
the Bolshevik menace as far as possible.
Mr. Winston Churchill asked whether any measures could be
taken to counteract it, and, if so, what they should be. Would not
the money which it was proposed to spend in Eastern Persia be better
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