Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎100v] (200/290)

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employed in supporting Denikin ? He recalled Bismarck’s answer,
when he was asked what steps he proposed to take for the protection
of German against French interests in West Africa. He had replied
that this object could best be attained by a sortie from Metz.
Bismarck’s theory was to strike at the heart of the enemy, and he
thought that this should be our theory too. If the Bolsheviks were
to be allowed to overrun Denikin, we had better abandon any attempt
to checkmate them.
The Chairman observed that Denikin could not defend Meshed,
the protection of which was the immediate question. The fall of
Khorasan would expose the entire eastern frontier of Persia. He
pointed out that no very great expenditure or sacrifice was involved
in General Malleson’s retention. His whole force, even when rein
forced, would not amount to more than about 3,000 men.
Henry Wilson said that, if Denikin was beaten, the
Bolsheviks would obtain command of the Caspian, and there appeared
to be nothing to prevent them from landing at Enzeli.
The Chairman reminded the Conference that we held Kazvin,
and could defend the Persian capital even if Gilan reverted to the
state of anarchy in which it had been under Kuchik Khan and the
Jangahs. He was anxious to keep General Malleson where he was.
If he were withdrawn the Bolsheviks might be in Meshed within a
fortnight. I heir occupation of one of the principal provinces of
Persia would, in his opinion, be a capital disaster.
Mr. Winston Churchill said he was not advocating the with
drawal of General Malleson, which he agreed would be exceedingly
unwise, but he "was nervous about any unnecessary increase of
expenditure, and was opposed to the extension of the railway.
/ he Chairman thought it very unlikely that the Bolsheviks
would risk a codison with Malleson’s force. This force had been
even weaker before it withdrew from Transcaspia, but it had held
its ground without difficulty, mainly owing to the fact that our
troops were the only men who, when fighting occurred, did not run.
No aggressive .movement was contemplated.
Mr. Winston Churchill read a telegram in which it was reported
that there were 15,000 Bolsheviks between Kizil Arvat and
Krasnovodsk , three Bolshevik divisions at Orenberg were free to
advance on Khorasan if they liked. Orenberg was a very long way
away, and he was prepared to admit that this particular menace was
not likely to materialise for two or three months. But if Denikin
were defeated by the Bolsheviks, any attempt to check their advance
by a small force, such as that under General Malleson’s command,
would be like trying to hold back the tide with a mop.
Sir Henry Wilson was anxious to know whether there was any
possibility of our getting the Amir of Afghanistan on to our side.
The War Office was not directly responsible for General Malleson’s
operations, as he was under the Commander-in-Chief in India, but
it was clear that, if the Bolsheviks really advanced, he could not
possibly remain where he was. It seemed to him of the utmost
importance that every effort should be made to secure the co-opera
tion of the Amir of Afghanistan. He did not quite understand for
what purpose it had been suggested that General Malleson should
be provided with aeroplanes, but, in any case, the machines were not
available.
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Genci al Thwaites said that our information was so fragmentary
and contradictory that it was difficult to form a reliable appreciation
of the correctness of General Malleson’s reports.
Mr. Montagu read a telegram from which it appeared that
Bravin had recently reported that the Afghans would not fight the