Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎99v] (198/290)

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Mr. Montagu said that, in his opinion, the Transcaspian question
could not be discussed separately from the whole problem of
Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism. He did not quite understand why
Pan-Islamism was always regarded as necessarily a menace to
British interests. If the Afghans thought that their best means of
securing the extension of their northern frontiers was by an alliance
with the Bolsheviks, they would surely contract such an alliance,
whatever we might do to try and stop them. He would like to ask
two questions of the military experts : in the first place,^ he wished
to know whether, so far as India was concerned, the right place,
from a military point of view, to meet an attack on India was in
Transcaspia or on the frontier of India itself. Secondly, lie would
be glad to know what was the real contemplated objective of
General Malleson. Was he merely showing the flag, or was he
serving as a jumping-off place for the defence of Persia? If he were
only a news centre, the extension of the railway to Neh did not
appear to be justified by the requirements of the situation. He
would also be glad of the opinion of the Director of Military
Intelligence on the reliability ol the reports telegraphed by General
Malleson, which did not appear to him to be sufficiently carefully
weighed before they were despatched.
Sir Henry Wilson said, with regard to Mr. Montagu s first
question, that the further away from India an attack could be met
the better it would be for us. If, however, there was to be any
question of meeting the Bolshevik menace to India in firanscaspia
it could only be in co-operation with the Afghans. If the Amir of
Afghanistan would fight the Bolsheviks, so much the better for us ;
if he would not, we could not contemplate operations in the
direction of Merv. With regard to General Malleson’s objective,
he was under the impression that when he returned from Trans
caspia, he was only retained at Meshed as a kind of intelligence
agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. .
The Chairman said that the object of General Malleson’s
retention at Meshed was rather more than this. He was to act as
a deterrent against a Bolshevik invasion of Persia, and his presence
there with a substantial force had certainly so far achieved this
object. He would go further, and say that he was convinced that
his continued presence there, if reinforced, would still have the same
effect.
Sir Hemuj Wilson pointed out that, whatever might be the
actual obligation incurred by His Majesty’s Government in concluding
the recent Agreement with Persia, there could be little doubt that
General Malleson’s presence at Meshed led the Persians to expect
that we would assist them against a Bolshevik invasion. He thought
that the Bolshevik threat was likely to increase rather than decrease
in the near future.
Mr. Montagu asked whether he was correct in deducing from
what had been said that, of whatever use General Malleson’s force
might be as a deterrent against an invasion of Persia, the retention
of a British force at Meshed was not the right way to protect India.
It would, in any case, have been absurd to maintain that the reten
tion of General Malleson was solely a question for India; but, if he
was correct in his assumption, it did not appear to be even primarily
an Indian question.
The Chairman said that, with regard to the defence of India,
his excuse for offering an opinion on a military matter was the fact
that he had continually discussed the question with the late Lord
Kitchener at the time when the latter was Commander-in-Chief in
India, and he was Viceroy. It had never been contemplated at that
time that the defence of India should be conducted further away T
than the actual frontier. What had been agreed upon was that if