Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎99r] (197/290)

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The Afghans, then, were in a strong position ; they had
recovered their lost territory, and were playing for the reinstatement
of Afghanistan as .the centre of a great Moslem confederation in
Central Asia. He did not think that their relations with the
Bolsheviks meant any more at present than that they were ready to
bargain with them with that end in view.
Turning to Bokhara, we found a strong Sunni element led by
the Mullahs, who really controlled Bokharan politics. He had no
doubt that they were essentially anti-Bolshevik.
The remaining Moslem state of Khiva lay far away in the
desert, and did not, he thought, exercise any great influence on the
situation. Probably Khiva might also be regarded as anti-Bolshevik.
The T urcomans of Transcaspia, whom he had already mentioned,
were cowed and submissive, but distinctly on our side ; they were,
however, at present submerged by the superior forces of the
Bolsheviks.
Concurrently with the various missions which were converging
on Kabul, the Amir of Afghanistan was sending missions to Tashkent
and Moscow. Flitting in the background was the sinister figure of
Kazim Beg, who was intensely anti-British and was conducting a
violent propaganda for the alliance of Pan-Islam with Bolshevism.
These were the dramatis personae. Assuming then, that the
invasion of Khorasan were to materialise and that it would constitute
a menace to ourselves in India, we had next to consider what was
already being done, or what further steps could be taken, to guard
against the danger. The Viceroy was doing his best to close the
Indian frontier against spies and suspicious foreigners, and to keep
out Bolshevik agents and literature. Anti-Bolshevik propaganda
was also being disseminated both by wireless outside India
and in the Indian press whenever opportunity presented itself. He
was not, however, convinced that the Viceroy was altogether well
served by the external intelligence system of the Government of
India. Earlier in the day a suggestion had been made by the
Secretary of State for India that a secret Indian Mission should
be despatched to Bokhara. This suggestion had been carefully
considered, both by the Viceroy and by General Malleson, and it had
been decided, he thought wisely, not to proceed with the proposal.
The military position was that General Malleson was at Meshed
in command of a force consisting of one regiment of cavalry and
one battalion of infantry : he also had a line of communications
extending to railhead at Duzdap, but he had no aeroplanes. He
would ask the military experts to express an opinion on the military
possibilities, but his own impression was that the menace was
inconsiderable, provided that Malleson remained at Meshed with a
strong waiting force. He would, however, need some more support,
and three main proposals had been put forward, upon which he
would invite the Conference to come to a decision : Firstly, that he
should be reinforced by a battery of mountain artillery and another
battalion of infantry. (It appeared from the Viceroy’s telegram of
the 1st November that these were already being despatched.)
Secondly, that he should be provided with a flight of aeroplanes.
Thirdly, that the railway should be extended from Duzdap to Neh.
The road between these two places was at present fit for light motor
traffic, but its improvement to the proper standard for heavy
mechanical transport would present great difficulties, and involve
heavy expenditure.
Replying to a question by Mr. Montagu, he said that, though
His Majesty’s Government were bound by the recently-concluded
Anglo-Persiau Agreement to respect the independence and integrity
of Persia, he did not consider that they were under any technical
obligation to protect the existing frontiers of that country from
external attack. At the same time, he thought that there was a
moral obligation inherent in the Agreement to support the Persians
as far as possible in their own efforts to resist invasion.
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