Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎98v] (196/290)

it was only recently that they had renewed serious activity. They
were now advancing on Krasnovodsk, to the occupation of which
place they appeared to attach great importance, and had reached
Kizil Arvat, which was about two-thirds of the way from Merv to
Krasnovodsk. If they succeeded in obtaining possession of the port,
they would doubtless take steps to establish communication with
their Bolshevik friends on the other side of the Caspian. Krasnovodsk
was held by about 2,700 of Denikin’s volunteers, whose position
from a military point of view was precarious, as they were greatly
outnumbered by the Bolshevik force that was advancing against
them. At the other end of the line we had to consider the Tashkent
Government, whose forces had originally cinsisted mainly of enemy
prisoners, hut who now appeared to be growing in strength, and were
contemplating a descent on Khorasan. There were three lines of
advance open to them : through Askabad and Kuchan; through
Astrabad; or on Meshed fr om the north-east. They were poorly
supplied with resources, and it was only natural that they should
cast covetous eyes on the richer country which would provide them
with the food and supplies of which they stood in need.
In any consideration of this problem we were, as usual, brought
up against the bewildering factor of Afghan politics. It was
impossible for anyone to form any definite opinion on the intentions
of the Afghans : it appeared from the conflicting reports which had
been received from various sources that they themselves had not
formulated any definite line of policy, though it might reasonably
be assumed that their chief motive was self aggrandisement.
Afghanistan was, in his opinion, the pivot of the situation. It was
the only Moslem state left in Asia which could form a rallying
point ; the smaller states of Bokhara and Khiva were comparatively
unimportant, though their attitude must, of course, be taken into
consideration. It was the undoubted ambition of the young Amir
of Afghanistan, Amanullah, to set himself up as a leader of Moslem
sentiment and to give the impression to the Moslem world that he
was successfully holding his own against the British. The political
importance of Afghanistan was universally recognised. Missions had
been despatched to Kabul from every quarter by the various parties
who wanted to fish in these troubled waters. The first Bolshevik
mission, headed by Bravin, left Tashkent in June and arrived at
Herat in July, and at Kabul in September. He was followed by
military or diplomatic missions despatched from Moscow by the
Bolshevik Government, and by the Intelligence Branch of the
German General Staff from Berlin. A desperado of the name of
Suric, who was described as an Extraordinary Representative of the
Russian Republic, left Tashkent at the end of October for Herat.
He was clearly following in the footsteps of Bravin, in the hope of
succeeding where the latter was alleged to have failed.
The young Amir of Afghanistan was no longer at war with the
Government of India, who had recently concluded a somewhat
inglorious peace with him. It would be remembered that in earlier
correspondence with the Government of India concerning the late
Amir, one of the pawns of which we had suggested that use might
be made, was the desire of the Afghans to recover their old frontier
at and beyond Panjdeh. Amanullah, by flirting with the Bolsheviks
had already extended his northern frontier far beyond the early
dreams of his father and grandfather, and his troops were reported
to be in Merv. He had been using the Bolsheviks for his own
purposes and giving them nothing in return. What he was playino-
for was to obtain from these various missions supplies and ammun£
tion to recoup him for what he had lost by the closing down of his
Indian sources of supply. The cleverness with which he was making
use of the Bolsheviks was remarkable, but it would be premature
for us to draw the conclusion that he was actuated by any other
tnotive than his own ambitions. J