Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎89v] (178/290)

L
Mr. Barstow said that the last meeting had ended in the
question whether we could not leave the Kurds to their own devices.
Mesopotamian
Railways.
2. Turning to the question of the policy to be adopted in Ivurdisb
areas adjoining Mesopotamia, t^e Chairman said that at the last
meeting it had been decided that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. should telegiaph
for the views of the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, on the
desirability of our retaining control over this area, and that
meanwhile there was no necessity for the G.O.C. Mesopotamia
to be ordered to cease work on the Kirkuk line. I he last
decision that had been taken in London about these areas was that
Colonel Wilson’s proposal to form a fringe of autonomous Kurdish
states on the Northern and Eastern boundaries of the Mosul vilayet
should be approved. Since then there had been many acts of
violence in that quarter. British officers had been killed, lurkish
agitation had spread, and Southern Kurdistan was still apparently
the scene of active warfare. The Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, in
his reply to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. telegram which was despatched as a result
of the last meeting, deprecated the suggestion that Southern Kurdistan
should be evacuated. He pointed out that the Suleimaniyeh division
had always been regarded by the Turks as part of Mesopotamia ;
that it was so classified in the Sykes-Picot agreement, and that
geographically and strategically it belonged to Mesopotamia and not
Kurdistan. He said that we were governing Southern Kurdistan
not by force but by consent, though no Government in these days
could carry on without force behind it. Railways and roads were
powerful civilising factors, and it was to this aspect of their con
struction rather than to their strategical value that he looked for
results in Southern Kurdistan. The Kifri-Kirkuk line had been
recognised by practically every railway expert as being the only
alignment likely to be profitable, and fuller investigation during the
last two years had completely confirmed this view. It passed
through an oilfield of proved value, and through the principal
wheat-growing tracts of Mesopotamia, and it would tap forest and
pastoral produce that was badly needed. It was to be observed that
these views were supported by the G.O.O. Mesopotamia.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that the construction of this railway
had been urged as an immediate military necessity. He was of
opinion that Colonel Wilson’s main arguments, which laid stress on
the civilising and economising value of the line were consequently
irrelevant. He was inclined to think that this aspect could await
consideration until the question of the mandate was definitely
settled. General Radcliffe had said at the last meeting that if the
railway were not built the troops would have to be withdrawn.
They had, however, apparently maintained themselves for a con
siderable time without the railway, and he did not therefore
understand the immediate urgency of the case.
Colonel Gribbon said that the transport arrangements by which
the force was at present maintained were expensive, and would be
difficult to maintain in the winter. The Kifri-Kirkuk line was to
be on the metre gauge, and part of the material was to be provided
by taking up the Kut-Baghdad or Basrah-Amara sections. The best
test, in his opinion, of the steps that would be necessary to maintain
order in Southern Kurdistan was an examination of the measures
which the Turks had found it necessary to take for this purpose.
They had always kept a strong garrison at Kirkuk and Suleimaniyeh.
Building the railway would not necessarily involve active military
or political steps in the Suleimaniyeh area, though we should of
course have to maintain garrisons along the line and at Kirkuk.
Sir Arthur liirtzel pointed out that it was quite possible that
troops could be evacuated so long as there was a railway by which
they could be brought back if necessary, and that it was not
essential to the argument that a strong force should still be kept
actually in the area.