Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎90r] (179/290)

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If the construction of the line were now to be urged on purely
commercial grounds, the proposal must be weighed against similar
schemes in other parts of the Empire. The position appeared to be
that Southern Kurdistan was a desirable place, and that we were
entitled to it, but the economical development of the area would
have to be considered in comparison with that of other areas in
Africa and elsewhere. The line had also been recommended as the
best means of access to Mosul. He was not aware whether the
retention of Mosul was a matter in which His Majesty’s Government
were deeply interested.
Mr. Montagu said that Mosul had come to be regarded as a
banner: he did not think that Colonel Wilson’s views could be
ignored, supported as they were by the G.O.C. Mesopotamia. If we
ran away from Kurdistan, we ran the risk of weakening our hold
on Mesopotamia. At the same time he wished to record his strong
conviction, which he had expressed on more than one occasion, that
it would be a mistake for us to treat Mesopotamia as if it were to
become a second India, in the sense of assuming the whole
responsibility for its administration.
The Chairman said that a mandate was about to be conferred
on Great Britain for Mesopotamia, which would almost certainly
include Mosul. It was true that the strategical argument for the
construction of this line seemed to have disappeared. He was
inclined to view the question more in the light of the necessity for
providing a line of access to Mosul. Were we to be content with
the alternative line by the river, or should we take up the other line,
which had great economic possibilities ? By common consent the
Kirkuk line was pronounced to be the better of the two. Had we
not better take advantage of the existing favourable conditions as
regards labour and material, and of the fact that some proportion of
the earthwork had already been completed, to finish it now ? We
might have Mosul under us in a year’s time, and he feared that if we
negatived the project now we might then regret having done so.
Mr. Barstow said that in his personal opinion there was a strong
case for the line, but that he must refer the matter to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer. He did not think that on the assumptions of
policy as to Mosul the Treasury would contest the arguments that
had been brought forward in its favour.
The Conference decided :
That, subject to the consent of the Treasury, the proposal should
be approved.
Policy of
His Majesty’s
Government in
Kurdistan.
3. The Conference decided :
That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should discuss
the whole question with Field-Marshal Allen by on his
arrival, at the same time as the question of responsibility
for Kurdish areas.
Foreign Office,
September 2, 1919.
(Initialled) C. of K.