Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎71v] (142/290)

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actuated, as he said, by the most pacific intentions, had proceeded
to the frontier with tne object of preventing a disturbance in
territory which was, by our definition, outside his dominions, lo
make his pacific intentions quite clear he had collected an army of
12,000 men to accompany him. There had been a collision between
one of his lieutenants—Sultan Ibn Bijad—and Abdulla at
Tarabah, which lay about 25 miles south-west of Khurma, Ihe
casualties did not appear to have been heavy, and were apparently
confined to the death or capture—it was not clear which—of one
of his preachers, but Abdulla must have won the engagement
because he was reported to have advanced on Khurma. At this
stage King Hussein's dormant conscience had been awakened. He
had deprecated further bloodshed among Arabs, and with unusual
consideration for His Majesty’s Treasury had declared that he
could not be a party to further uncalled-for expenditure on his
behalf by Great Britain. He had once again played his familiar
abdication card, and had appealed to the Almighty to see him
through. It appeared that the present position was covered by
the decision reached at the last meeting.
Mr. Shuckburgh read the telegram which had been despatched
to Baghdad by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , and repeated to Cairo by the
Foreign Office, as a result of the last meeting of the Conference
(I.D.C.E. 458).
Mr. Philby, replying to Mr. Montagu, said he did not think
that Ibn Saud would know when King Hussein was in one of his
recurring resignation moods. He did not‘liimself think that the
message now suggested by General Allenby would have the desired
effect. Ibn Saud would say to himself that he had already lost
half of his subsidy, that he only stood to lose the other half, but
that on the other hand he had a very good chance of taking Mecca.
The Chairman said that while it had always been recognised
that a collision was probably inevitable, this was no reason why
efforts should not be made to avert it. The last meeting of the
Conference had decided, whether rightly or wrongly, that His
Majesty’s Government would back Hussein and not Ibn Sand in
respect of Khurma. They had authorised Hussein to take adminis
trative measures there, and he had accordingly done so, on mili
tary lines. They had also said that they could not allow aggressive
Wahabism to threaten the Holy Places or the Hejaz proper. A
decision having been arrived at on both points, it only remained
for the Conference to confirm it and to consider what form the
next communication to Ibn Saud should take. He was doubtful
about the term “Najd proper ” in General Allenby’s proposal.
Mr. Philby that the boundary of Najd proper was really
the whole question in dispute.
Mr. Shuckburgh pointed out that the next message to Ibn
Saud ought to refer to the previous communication. Logically, he
ought to be told to leave Khurma; it would not be enough to tell
him not to move further to the West. This would be a weakening
of our previous attitude.
Mr. Philby, replying to a question bv the Chairman, expressed
the opinion that no threat would of itself be sufficient to induce
Ibn Saud to withdraw. Nothing short of force would have this
result. Even a warning that the whole might of the British
Government would be definitely ranged against him would not in
the present circumstances, weigh with him against local considera
tions. He had to think of his position in Arabia, and was mare