Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎72r] (143/290)

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nearly concerned with his local prestige than with his status
vis-a-vis His Majesty's Government.
Mr. Kidston suggested that blockade measures in some form
appeared to be the best means of bringing pressure to bear on Arab
chiefs in the interior of Arabia.
Mr. Shuckburgh said that experience had shown that blockade
measures in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. were very difficult to make effective.
Colonel Gribbon said that it was not known exactly what
Abdulla's forces were, but that enquiries were being made as to
the disposal of Turkish material captured at Medina. He asked
whether the War Office proposal to provide King Hussein with
Tanks should not now be followed up. Even if the Tanks could
not arrive in time, and were actually used, he thought that the
knowledge that Hussein was provided with these formidable
engines might have a beneficial effect on the Arab mind.
The Chairman pointed out that the gift of Tanks to King
Hussein was open to serious objection. He understood that the
actual machines which it was proposed to hand over were of no
serious military value, and that it was unlikely that the Arabs
would be able to bring them into operation at all. He was pre
pared to admit that the mentality of Ibn Baud—which was really
the pivotal point of this discussion—might be of a very primitive
nature, but he thought that it was open to question whether it
would be greatly impressed by the arrival in the Hejaz of half a
dozen worn-out machines which could not be induced to cross the
desert. But the real reason why he had objected to the proposal
was that the Tanks were to be handed over in Cairo, and he had
some fear in his own mind that they were intended for use against
the French in Syria, where their inefficiency would not counteract
the unfortunate political effect of any suggestion that His
Majesty’s Government were supporting our Arab against our
European allies.
With regard to King Hussein’s threat of abdication, he was
gradually coming to the conclusion that this was not such a serious
prospect from the point of view of His Majesty's Government as
it had been considered in the past. The vision of a powerful and
combined Arab nation headed by the Sherif of Mecca was gradu
ally receding, and he doubted whether the Arab movement as it
now stood would lose much by King Hussein's abdication, pro
vided he was replaced by a son who was capable of filling his
place.
Replying to Mr. Montagu, he pointed out that King Hussein
had always been opposed to any idea of arbitration, and he thought
that he would be still less likely to accept it now that his forces
appeared to be victorious.
After some discussion, in the course of which various other
suggestions for bringing pressure to bear on Ibn Saud were put
forward—
The Chairman said that there was no real difficulty in
deciding what His Majesty’s Government should do. The whole
matter had been fully discussed at the last meeting, and the present
position had been foreseen. They were definitely committed to
backing King Hussein, and the only question was what form the
communication to Ibn Saud should take. He thought that the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. should be asked to send a message to Ibn Saud at once
through Baghdad, referring to the previous message, and pointing
out that as he had not thought fit to conform to the advice given
him, he must now realise that unless he withdrew at once from the