Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎70v] (140/290)

General Kirke pointed out that the command of the Caspian
would be as important to General Denikin as it was at present to our
troops in the Caucasus. If the Bolsheviks obtained command of the
Caspian, General Denikin’s position would be seriously threatened.
As regards destroying material in the Caspian which he could use,
it would seem illogical to do so, whilst, at the same time, we were
pouring warlike stores into the Black bea ports in order to assist
him.
General Groves, replying to a question by the Chairman arising
out of paragraph 5 ol the draft telegram, said that all remaining
R.A.F. stores which were not actually handed over to Denikin would
be evacuated by rail in the same way as those military stores, which
would have to be brought away when the army withdrew.
General Kirke, in reply to a question by Sir Rosslyn \\ emyss,
said that the naval and military withdrawals were interdependent. In
the event of the Italians deciding not to take over the naval and
military responsibilities in the Caspian and the Caucasus, it would
be necessary to consult General Denikin as to the length of time
which he would require to enable him to take over, and then decide
whether we could wait or not.
The Chairman said that the first essential was to obtain definite
and authoritative information as to the intentions of the Italians.
At the same time, there would be no objection to a hint being given
to our naval and military authorities that there was a possibility that
the Italians might after all decline to pursue their original intention.
It did not appear necessary that the Conference should meet
again to discuss these questions, as they had fully considered the
possible alternatives, and action could be taken by the Departments
concerned as soon as they knew definitely what the Italians intended.
The Conference decided :—
1. That the Foreign Office should telegraph to Mr. Balfour in
Paris, explaining the difficulties in connection with the
withdrawal, and asking for definite information as to the
intentions of the Italians.
2. That the War Office and Admiralty should telegraph privately
to the local authorities concerned, as suggested by the
Chairman, leaving it to their discretion whether they
should take General Denikin into their confidence with a
view to ascertaining, in the event ol the withdrawal of
the Italians, how long it "would be before he was ready
to take over.
3. That the War Office should await replies to these telegrams,
and consult the Admiralty, before issuing further definite
instructions to General Briggs.
(Initialled) C. of K.
Foreign Office,
May 22, 1919.