Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎70r] (139/290)

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men were available as reinforcements for the Middle East, and heavy
calls had recently been made upon them by General Allenby. There
was, however, no particular virtue in the date of the loth June,
which had been mentioned for the commencement of the evacuation,
and the War Office were quite ready to postpone it for a short time
if it proved necessary to do so. With regard to the fleet in the
Caspian, he certainly thought it should be handed over to Denikin.
He would be no worse off than he was now if the Bolsheviks took it
from him, while the possession of it would at least give him a
sporting chance.
Mr. Kids ton asked whether the naval base could not be trans
ferred to Enzeli.
(leneral Cox, thought that the consequent establishment of a
line of communications from Hamadan through Kazvin might be
feasible. It would be considerably shorter than the present line,
but he feared that the supply of oil for the fleet would be difficult
to arrange.
The Chairman pointed out that the fleet would serve no useful
purpose at Enzeli. Now that Trans-Oaspia was evacuated, it would
have nothing to do at Krasnovodsk, and it had no function in
respect of Persia. It would be difficult to explain a transfer of the
fleet to Enzeli otherwise than by confessing that we did not know
what to do with it and were ashamed to hand it over to Denikin.
He did not consider that we were called upon to fight the Bolsheviks
in the Caspian any longer, in view of our withdrawal from Trans-
Caspia and the Caucasus.
Sir Rosshjn Wemyss said that the situation did not really
justify our retaining a naval force in the Caspian. He had informed
the Italians that he was ready to hand the fleet over to them, and he
would be equally willing to hand it over to Denikin. The Italians
did not appear to welcome the idea of taking over the fleet.
Replying to a question by the chairman, he said that if the
Italians changed their minds again, and decided to take over the
fleet, he would be prepared to maintain the British naval force
until they were ready to do so/on the understanding that the army
remained to guard the line of communications.
General Kirke said that the War Office were anxious to help
Denikin as far as they could, but they wished to put an end as early
as possible to the present position by which large numbers of
British troops were locked up in the Caucasus.
Mr. Kidston said that our withdrawal from the Caucasus
amounted to a betrayal of the Georgians to whom we had given
assurances of sympathy in their aspirations to set themselves up as
an independent State.
Professor Simpson said that the withdrawal would be a
challenge to Bolshevism. Many of the local peoples would prefer
Bolshevism to what they regarded as the reactionary government of
Denikin.
The Chairman said that the question of policy involved in the
withdrawal from the Caucasus was not at present before the
Conference for discussion.
He read a draft telegram which had just been received from
the D.M.O. (I.D.C.E. 14(32), and which the latter proposed to send. *
* Sir Eosslyn Wemyss pointed out that the first paragraph of this
telegram, which gave the middle of June as the date for commencing
the military withdrawal, was open to the objections which the
Admiralty had already pointed out. He asked whether the question of
the command of the Caspian Sea after the withdrawal was really a
matter of grave concern to His Majesty’s Government.