Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎69v] (138/290)

of the Conference. If the Italians were really drawing back and
he could not for a moment conceive that they would persist in then
hastily formed first intention- tlie alternatives before the Conterence
were reduced to handing over the fleet to Denikin or allowing it to
fall into Bolshevik hands. He hoped that in no case would it be
found necessary to destroy it.
Sir Rosslyn Wemyss said the position was that Denikin could
not at present maintain or man the fleet even if it were handed over
to him, and that it would probably fall into Bolshevik hands in any
case. If. on the other hand, it were not so handed over, Denikin’s
susceptibilities might be hurt. He was not aware to what extent
this would be undesirable from a political point of view. He did
not wish to appear to advocate the destruction of the fleet, but
tactical considerations 1 might in certain circumstances necessitate
this course if it were not found practicable to hand it over.
Captain Goode, replying to questions by the Chairman, said
that the fleet was composed of nine armed merchantmen. live or
six other vessels were in process of being fitted out, some as
carriers for motor-boats and some as supply ships. There were
also twelve coastal motor-boats. The fitting of seaplane carriers
had now been stopped. These seaplanes were distinct from the
machines which bombed Astrakhan.
The British complement numbered about 700.
He was not sure of the present state of the armament. Several
of the ships had at first been armed with old 12-pounder and
4‘7-inch guns. A number of new 4-inch and 6-inch guns had
since been despatched, but he was not aware to what extent
rearmament had been carried out. The fleet was efficient enough
for the purposes for which it had been created. On more than one
occasion since the ice had broken it had turned back the Bolshevik
fleet.
The Chairman said that General Denikin was already being
provided with supplies and ammunition and a few military officers,
and asked whether the Admiralty could provide personnel in the
event of his being unable to man the ships. Was there any body
of men who could be called upon to volunteer for Denikin’s navy ?
Sir Rosslyn Wemyss said that with the possible exception of
individual officers he did not think volunteers would be forth
coming. He strongly deprecated the retention of any British naval
personnel after the army had been withdrawn. The naval position
was unprecedented, as the navy were operating in a land-locked
sea, and were dependent upon the army for their line of com
munications.
General Groves said that the R.A.F. mission comprised about
100 officers and men. The first essential to any withdrawal was to
dispose somehow of the aircraft which were now bombing
Astrakhan, as they were dependent upon the railway line from
Baku to Petrovsk.
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The Chairman observed that Admiralty letter No. M. 02100
contemplated the possibility that General Denikin’s first move on
obtaining the fleet would be to occupy Baku. If, as he himself
thought, Denikin’s ambitions lay towards the south rather than the
north, the capture of Baku would certainly appeal to him. He had
not much sympathy with the Georgians, who had been behaving
very badly of late. It almost looked as if they wished us to leave
the country.
General Kirke said that from a military point of view the
governing factor was man-power. Some 40 to 50 per cent, of our
troops at Constantinople and in the Caucasus were due for demo
bilisation, and the War Office wished to concentrate the remainder
at Constantinople as soon as possible. Only a limited number of