Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎29r] (57/290)

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the support we gave to Denikin from now onwards. In supporting
him we were, without a doubt, backing Russian Imperialism.
Denikin had done as yet no serious fighting against the Bolshevists
towards the north and north-west, and his real intention was
centred at present on the Caucasus States.
Mr. Winston Churchill disagreed with this view, and pointed
out that four out of five of Denikin’s men were fighting on the
north frontier. Even his recent big victory in the Caucasus had
been in the nature of a counter-attack.
The Chairman asked Professor Simpson what would be the
effect on the Caucasus peoples if we withdrew. The intention of
• Paris seemed to be to recognise them as independent States. This
was certainly the case with Georgia. But at this moment we
seemed to be proposing to extinguish them by our evacuation. Could
we do so?
Mr. Simpson said that if we did so now he would begin to
understand the meaning of the phrase “ perfidious Albion.’ We
had, from the start of the war, stated with perfect definiteness that
our interests and our intentions were to support ideals of nation
ality and self-determination in relation to the little nations.
Perhaps the intensity of national feeling amongst these non-Slav
Border States— Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Georgia,
Ac.—was not fully realised in England. They were determined
not to go back into a reconstituted centralised Russia, and they
were ready to fight to the bitter end. It seemed to him that in the
end some of them might have to return on economic grounds, but
the only way of getting them to return was to let them learn by
experience that they were not yet sufficiently advanced to get on by
themselves. Once that lesson had been learned they might go back
of their own motion, as federal units, into a decentralised
liberalised Russia. For the next generation the Caucasus looked
like being a second Balkans, and its importance from a strategic
and economic point of view could not be exaggerated.
One point seemed to emerge with some clearness: if we with
drew, the Germans and Turks would come in, unofficially, as
civilians even before the Russians. It would also give another
impetus to the Bolsheviks. The fear of Russia was so strong
amongst these States that they would probably throw r themselves
into the arms of Germany rather than face Russia without support.
It seemed to him that a counter-policy to Denikin’s aims was
required, and that counter-policy should be to remain in the
Caucasus and keep Denikin out till the Peace Conference had
settled the question.
The Chairman said we had to face the problem of wTiat would
happen if the Peace Conference recognised these States, but nobody
was willing to accept the mandate. Did Professor Simpson pro
pose that we should go on bolstering up Georgia indefinitely, or
was it not inevitable that w 7 e should have to withdraw ?
Mr. Simpson said that it seemed to him we could withdraw
with more honour if we did so in accordance with the decision of
the Peace Conference.
Mr. Winston Churchill said that Professor Simpson had laid
his finger on the root of the problem when he asked whether we
contemplated a reunited Russia, or whether w'e w r ere for the small
States. He asked which Professor Simpson himself was for.
Mr. Simpson said he was not for anything, but had simply
been viewing things as they were. Russia’s unaided recovery
would be a matter of decades. The great danger now T was that
a defeated and embittered Germany and Russia would act together.
He thought it wise for the present to support the independence