Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎29v] (58/290)

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of all these small non-Slav Border States, where a will to resist
Bolshevism had been manifested stronger than in Russia proper,
aud let them try and learn for themselves whether they were still
too backward to stand alone or not. In that case he thought some
of them might willingly return, and we would always have their
friendship. Nor must it be forgotten that it was Britain who was
making Russia Imperialistic by helping Denikin.
Mr. Winston Churchill said we were in the Caucasus to help
the small States, not against Russia, but against anarchy.
The Chairman said Professor Simpson’s answer indicated
that he was in warm sympathy with these States, but he saw that
if Russia revived they were doomed. At the same time he wished
their reabsorption to be a peaceful rather than a bloody one.
It seemed to him that the result of this Conference ought to
be first, to sanction the destruction of the Bolshevik fleet at
Astrakhan; second, to draw up a programme of evacuation; and,
third, to send our programme to Paris with the report of this Con
ference, for it was for Paris, not us, to come to the ultimate
decision on these matters.
Mr. Winston Churchill said that in addition to deciding on
the bombing of the Astrakhan fleet, and the preparation 6f a plan
for evacuation, he thought the Conference should also advise His
Ma jesty’s Government to enter into a convention with Denikin to
supply arms and munitions, a military mission, and naval support,
on condition he did not invade Georgia, and that he respected a
particular line of frontier in regard to the Caucasus States. The
plan of evacuation would necessarily take time to execute—three
or four months at least. A good deal could happen in that period;
the Peace Conference would have reached its conclusions, and there
would be opportunities to arrange for the future of Baku.
He also thought that it would be advisable to make it known
beforehand that we were going to evacuate. The knowledge might
have a wholesome effect on the attitude of the Georgians and other
tribes to our well-meant efforts; it might result in our being asked
by the people themselves to stay, so it was quite possible that the
mere expression of our intention to withdraw might make it easy
for us during the period of evacuation.
The Chairman said that Denikin must not be permitted to
invade Trans-Caucasia^ or to absorb the small States for the
present. He attached great importance to the setting up of the
line of frontier which it was proposed that Denikin should respect,
and considered that the Foreign Office should be consulted. The
previous line demarcated had not been adhered to by Denikin, and
steps must be taken to ensure that the same fate did not await the
new proposal. With regard to the evacuation, it would obviously
/have to begin in the east. The first thing was to get Malleson out
of Trans-Caspia into Persia ; Krasnovodsk would then have to be
evacuated, and our fleet in the Caspian disposed of, and the
Caucasus line step by step, from east to west, withdrawn. A
special arrangement might have to be made for Baku, and if
possible it should be internationalised.
The Conference decided — %
1. That the creation of an advanced air base for the purpose
of carrying out bombing operations against the Bol
shevist fleet at Astrakhan should be sanctioned.
2. To advise His Majesty’s Government to enter into a conven
tion with General Denikin, promising him the support
of (a) arms and ammunition, (b) a strong military
mission, and (c) the co-operation of the Navy in the
Caspian till he has taken Astrakhan (for which opera
tion a time limit should be set) ; such support to be