Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎270r] (539/544)

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it possible for us to do. As to the constitution of a national military force, that is a
thin^ which we have long advocated, and which we should like to see started at once.
We have put the South Persia Rifles into the pool; let the Russians put the Cossacks
into it, and you yourselves can contribute to the pool your Persian gendarmerie and
troops. Let us begin to constitute the national army or the national force of Persia at
once.” Here comes in a suggestion, made for the first time to my knowledge, in Sir Charles
Marling’s Paper. He says, and says rightly, that if such g. force is constituted, and if
money is to he found for it to any considerable extent by this country, the commander
ought to be an Englishman, but he makes the suggestion that it does not follow from that
that the other European officers who act under him should be Englishmen too, and he
evidentlv contemplates a force the officers of which are drawn from several European
States, but the chief controlling head of which should be an Englishman. The only
analogous situation that I can recall is the Customs administration in China, where you
had representatives of all sorts of nationalities under,as a rule, an Englishman at the head.
At any rate, Sir Robert Hart was there fur twenty or thirty years. So strong was the
position of the head of the Customs that when Hart retired, as the Foreign Office will
remember, there was a tremendous struggle on the part of the various Powers to try to
get the place if they could, on the ground that the man who was at the head really
coloured and controlled the whole of the administration. Therefore I do not think that
the idea that a British officer at the head must involve British officers all the way down
need necessarily be entertained, and there is something in Sir Charles Marling’s point of
view which is worthy of consideration.
The same with regard to rinance. I never agreed more strongly with the view of
the Foreign Office than when they laid down most definitely that the prodigious
financial stake which we have in Persia, if it is to be continued on any scale at all, must
involve a British financial adviser at the head of affairs. Here, again, Sir Charles
Marling makes a suggestion. He suggests that the fact that you have an Englishman
at the head need not necessarily involve that the subordinates must be Englishmen.
Lastly, in this conversation with the Persians, I would say, as we have already
said more than once, that we want to clear out our troops as soon as we can, that we do
not want to maintain an Indian force in Ispahan or Shiraz ; we only want to guarantee
the security of the trade routes. We do not want, any longer than we are obliged, to
maintain a force on the line Baghdad-Hamadan and the Caspian ; we only want to
safeguard Persia herself from worse dangers. Then, putting our cards on the table, and
pointing out what our policy should be, I would remember that it is in our power to
threaten. I would say to the Persian envoys, “ We have told you clearly what our
ideas are. Unless you fall in with them we must say frankly that we cannot go on any
longer. This gigantic expenditure on Persia, amounting to sums of something like
30 millions a year, cannot go on in any case on that scale. No doubt that is for the
moment very largely due to the British military occupation, which we hope to terminate
at the earliest possible moment, but even that part which is non-military cannot be
continued. We are willing to continue payments on a moderate scale for definite
objects which we will discuss with you, but beyond that we cannot go. If you do not
accept this situation, we must tell you frankly that we stop the thing altogether; we
cease these subsidies. We ask for the settlement of our claims, for the return of the
moratorium and all the various other debts. Unless you fall in with this line of policy,
we shall make ourselves as disagreeable as we can.’’ That is the kind of policy which I
am disposed to recommend. I cannot think that if the Persian representatives, provided
we were backed up as we should be by Nasr-ul-Mulk, who is a sensible and patriotic
man, had that situation put before them, they could deliberately go and ruin their
country by refusing such an offer. But suppose they do ? Suppose that, excited by
the expectation of what they are going to get in Paris, they say, We prefer to go to
Paris,” I should say, “ Go,” and then, when they have had their tumble they will come
back to us in a few months’ time and will accept with gratitude the terms which they
may have refused a month or tw r o before.
I have had no opportunity of consulting either the Foreign Office or the India
Office about the matter, and what I have given you is only my own opinion.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I have arrived at the same conclusion. I was very
much attracted at one time by the suggestion that really it was not justifiable for us
to go on spending this amount of money in Persia, that we had very little interest in
the place, that it was not at all certain that the good government ot Persia regally
mattered to us, and further that apparently our interference had not so tar, for various
reasons, conduced to the improvement of the government of Persia, but that, on the
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