Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎270v] (540/544)

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contrary, the Government had become decidedly worse than it was when we had
relatively less to do with them. Therefore I was disposed to think that there was a
good deal to be said for the “stewing in their own juice ” policy. But, on the whole, I
do not think that it is practicable and, owing to the presence of Starosselski and his
division, 1 think that the immediate result, if we were to disinterest ourselves altogether,
would be that Starosselski would take command, and if he is a man of any ability he
probably could make the thing pay and could find enough money in Persia to pay his
force and become the ruler of Persia. Therefore I have come to the conclusion that we
ought to take the course that Lord Curzon suggests. Iain all for saying all these things
to the Persian delegates. I do not think that it matters very much what we say to them,
because it is exceedingly unlikely that they will have any influence in their own country
when they get back. Therefore, the really important thing is to say all these things at
the same time to Yossugh-ed-Dowleh and the people who really matter out there. I
think that we should say them simultaneously to the two sets of people. I think that
the probability is that if the thing is done properly the Persians will accept the
two essential things, a financial adviser and a British commander of the forces.
Whether they are to have subordinate officers who are British or not does not seem
to me to matter very much. If they do not accept the two essential things, we shall
be in a dangerous position. There is a danger, not a very great one, that the
Persians might say, “You cannot get anything out of us”—which is, unfortunately,
true—“ except by a military occupation, and we do not believe that your people will
allow you to have a military occupation,” and Starosselski would be at the back of any
such movement as that, and he would say that he would govern the country and
pay his forces out of the country on a very reduced scale. I do not think that that
is very likely, but I think it would be worth while to consider what course we should
take in such a case as that. What are we prepared to do ? Are we prepared to send
a force and pay the bill ? I think that it is exceedingly doubtful whether we are.
LORD CURZON : I do not think that it is necessary to answer your question
low. It would be very difficult to do so. 1 think the case will be settled by cash.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I hope so.
LORD CURZON : It is all very well to say that Starosselski, where he has got
hold of the country, will be able to pay his troops and so on. It wull take some
considerable time before he does it, and every Persian wants a squeeze. Starosselski,
whatever his resources may be, will never be able to go on paying these subventions not
merely to the Persian Government but to the Shah.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I hope that that is so. I always rather like, before
embarking upon a policy, to think of the possible results supposing that everything
goes wrong. Conceivably you might have some philanthropic American millionaire
helping. You cannot tell. I cannot give any answer, but I would rather like to know
what in the last resort we would do supposing that the Persians refused to think about
our offers and said, “No, they proposed to go on and have independence and that they
would not have a financial adviser or a British commander and that we could do our
w’orst.” I think that that is very unlikely, but I would like to know exactly what we
should do under those circumstances. Now, I am afraid I must go.
LORD CURZON : You go at a very awkward moment. You agree generally
with the line of policy I sketched out ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I do, but I would like that particular point cleared
up somehow if it can be.
(Lord F. Cecil withdrew at this 'point.)
SIR A. HIRTZEL: Mr. Montagu strongly supports the proposals made by
Sir Hamilton Grant, which, he vifinks, are workable in themselves, and offer a last
possibility of reform within the limits of reasonable cost. He has not had the
advantage of hearing your statement; but I cannot help thinking that if he had
heard it he would have felt that, although you rejected Sir Hamilton Grant’s proposals,
the line of policy that you propose differs from it in substance really only very slightly.
I fancy that all the points that you suggested should be put to the Persian representa
tives, including the threat, are contained in Sir Hamilton Grant’s proposals, except the
insistence on the British military commander which Sir Hamilton Grant would have
left optional to the Persian Government. If that is so, the only difference is in the
wav in which the thing is to be put. I think that Mr. Montagu felt and would still
feel very much that it is worth while making the sort of bid which Sir Hamilton Grant