Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎269v] (538/544)

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that the representatives of the Foreign Office here who have Persian experience are against
it. \\ ith all respect to the policy, which seems to me to be the best paper policy, I cannot
regird it as a practical policy in the »ircumstancts.
Tnen it may be siMd, What are you coining to? The third suggestion which has
been made is one which I think for the moment is also out of the question. It is that
we should contemplate at this stage acting as the mandatory of the Powers or the
League of Nations as regards Persia. I am not at all clear myself that the d -mand will
e\er be made upon ns. It is by no means certain that mandatories are going to be
crated. Before you settle whether there are going to lie mandatory powers all over
the world, you have to constitute the League of Nations to give the invitation. I therefore
should not be disposed to spend much time in discussing whether or not we should
accept the invitation, because it has not yet been given, and it is not likely to be given
for S'»me months to come, if at all, and the whole situation mav have changed when that
moment arrives. Nor 1 think need we trouble ourselves very mucli at this stage
about the idea of a mandate being given to somebody other than ourselves. As soon as
they have any kind of hint as to the financial obligations that are entailed, I do not
thi k that there is any Power in the world who would look at it. If there is a question
of some neutral State being given the mandate, with ourselves find ng the means in the
backgiound, it is quite clear that such a solution can only be arrived at in the form in
which we decide to share it. and with our consent.
So we come to what I think are really the only solutions with which we can
proceed at the moment. I speak with deference t > the Foreign Office. I do not know
that l am expressing their views. What I am saying L rather the result of my own
study of the papers and earelul reflection on the situation during the last few days.
Persian delegates are coming over here. We are rather doubtful as to their political
character and complexion. We have grave suspicions of the objects with which they
come. We would like to keep them away from the Peace Conference, because, to tell
the truth, we see no reason why Per-da should be represented there at all, or why her
case should be stated 1 do not imagine, thereto; e, that we shall give her any particular
encouragement. However, that L a matter vliicli rests with the members of the Peace
Conference when they are assembled. Mv own view is th..t their inclination will be
not to ha^e Persia there at all. They will have such a mass of business that they will
not want to be bothered with these outside problems. But it may be that, arising out
of the position .of Ilussia or the ii rerests of Ge'm .ny, or somehow or other Persia will
come in ; and the foreign Office, I think, is quite right in its printed paper in providing
for that emergency and suggesting the line that we should take should that situation
arise. Let us suppose the w.T.-t Let us suppose that the Persians are admitted to
some discussion at the Peace Conference or a committee of the Peace Conference. My
own disposition is to think that they will verv soon find their own level, that the greater
part of these things will not interest the Peace Conference at all, that it will be seen
that they have no connection with the war, and that Persia is really out to fight a
battle for selfish interests, and that, presently, when it is discovered that the only people
who either have found money or are willing to find money are ourselves, whatever body
or committee is dealing with the matter will turn to us andsay, “ What are you prepared
to d*» f Are you willing to go on ? What is the solution that you propose ? ” There
fore, in the exireme case of the Persians getting to the Peace Conference, I am not very
much alarmed at the issue.
What 1 rather have in \ iew is a solution either outside the Peace Conference or con
currently with ihe Peace Conference. Let us suppose that these envoys appear on the
scene. It will be many weeks, ai d I daresay it may be months, before their ca^e is
taken in Paris. In that interval they will be in contact with us. They will very likely
c me to tins country. They will see representatives of the Foreign Office in Paris. My
own advice on the whole is that they be spoken to with the utmost frankness, and that
frankness need not be of a purely minatory c aracter, because it can perfectly well
contain the find of assurances as regards our policy in the future for wnich the Govern
ment of India plead. It will be po.-sible to :-ay to them : You are going to get nothing
out or the Peace Conference when you go there. If you think that you are, try your
B st and you will probably be disappointed. The grave misunderstanding which exists
we are as anxious as you are to remove, butyou have to realise the facts of the situation.
1 he points on which we are willing to meet you are wed known. Let us define them
again, and in a manner most agreeable to yourselves. The assurances as to your inde-
pendtnce and integrity we are wil ing to renew to you in any form, and if need be to win
the sanction of the Conference to them. The abrogati n of the Convention of 1 d07 we
will cany out in whatever form the circumstances which exLt at the present time render