Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎212r] (423/544)

19
L)
*
in some of the Papers, we ought not to rely upon our general position in Arabia
(assuming that our priority and superiority are there admitted) to carry us through
with Hussein, rather than upon any political treaty or agreement, which will coniine
the conduct of the political relations of his Court in our hands. I merely say that
in passing, and it binds nobody but myself. 1 suppose what we want to seouie is,
as far as possible, that the interests of other Powers shall be confined, to the subject
of their pilgrims. They have a right to a voice in those matters, whether they be
the French, the Italians, or other Powers. I assume, in those circumstances that
we should not try to prevent their having Consular representatives at Jeddah, or
wherever is considered desirable, in order to look after their pilgrim traffic. What
I do think is important is that we should not allow any of these representatives to
have a diplomatic status. Whether we do or do not disqualify ourselves from having
a Resident there, no other Power should exercise diplomatic functions of any sort,
through its representative, with King Hussein.
A point that is not alluded to in any of the Papers, which seemsi to me of
some importance, is this: what is going to happen, when the war is over, about
subsidies and arms? This rebellion of the Sherif was to a large extent organised,
and it has been almost entirely financed, by ourselves. What our total financial
obligations have been I do not know, but they must have been very large, and we
are going on paying the subsidy now. When the war is at an end, what is to happen
about a subsidy? Will Hussein, who will continue to want money perhaps on an
even larger scale (if his ambitions extend) than he receives now, come and say, “ You
must continue to subsidise me,” or will he come to the French and ourselves and say,
“ Both of you must subsidise me” ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: No.
LORD CLRZON: Should we contemplate an arrangement like that with the
Amir of Afghanistan, where the subsidy is provided exclusively by ourselves? We
would not tolerate a treaty by which the Amir could be allowed to take a subsidy
from anybody else. Is that the kind of relation we are going to endeavour to create
with King Hussein? I merely jtlirow out these points for examination by the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and the Foreign Office. Further, there is the question of arms. What
restrictions are we going to place upon the importation of arms in the future? If
he wants European arms, are we going to supply him? Are other Powers going to
be allowed to do it? Is a treaty to be negotiated which contains restrictions in these
respects? These points touch and turn upon the larger issue of the Power that is
to be in general political control in the Hejaz, and they will have to be discussed
and decided in that light.
One thing we must not do, and this is a commonplace of our policy, we must not
touch with the end of a bargepole the question of the Khali fate. That is a matter
exclusively for the Moslem world; whether they choose to elect King Hussein or any
body else does not seem to me to concern us. Of course, it would concern us in this
sense, that it is a very material thing in India and the countries we influence to
know to' whom they look as Khalif, and it might be in our interest, if King Hussein
succeeds in establishing his power, that he should be Khalif. All I mean is, that at
the moment we should take no active steps to influence the decision. We should
accept it whatever form it takes, hoping, now that the bultan of lurkey has dis
appeared from the stage, that if may take the form of being offered to the Sheirif
of Meoca.
The only other point upon which I want to say a word is the claim to overlord
ship or suzerainty of King Hussein over the whole of Arabia. The position is this,
as I understand it. From the start King Hussein has been shrewd enough upon
almost every occasion, either directly or by application, to make the claim on his
own behalf that he is to be the Sovereign of all Arabia, of all the Arab countries;
and, indeed, when Colonel Lawrence came here he told us that the title which he
bears in Arab countries, which was conferred upon him by an assembly of notables
and the Ulema at Mecca in the early days of the war, and which was afterwards
repeated at his coronation, is “ The Iving of the Arab countries,” in itself an indica
tion of the full extent of the claim he puts forward. On the other hand, I believe
I am rigjit in saying that, wide and sometimes rather perilous as have been the
admissions that we have made about fhe independence of Arabia and the Arabs, we
have not at any time said anvthing that commits us to a recognition of the full
claims of King*Hussein to which I have been referring. Amd, indeed, even if we
were disposed to do so, the task is beooming increasingly difficult, as we find that
public opinion in Mesopotamia, as reported to us, is veering away from the Sherif
[365—39] G