Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎211v] (422/544)

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set up with .him after the war, the soirt of treaty, if any, we should conclude with
him or with the Powers, the degree to which we should encourage, or discourage,
or prohibit, or qualify his relations with foreign Powers. Secondly, there is the
question of the degree to which we should encourage, discourage, negatively support,
or actively resist the pretensions he puts forward to the overlordship of the whole
of Arabia, these are important issues, and I think it is desirable that this
Committee should discuss them. I am prepared to start now if the Committee
approves.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: If you are prepared to make a statement of the
case, we might take that and then adjourn.
LORD CURZON: Very w’ell. My statement will be quite brief.
As regards our pledges to the King of the Hejaz, they have been more or less
referred to in our previous discussions. There was first the general series of pledges
as regards Arab independence, which, as we have heard, he is likely to interpret in
their most extreme and advanced sense. Secondly, there were the more specific
pledges given to him in the well-known and rather regrettable correspondence
between Sir Henry McMahon and himself. I need not recapitulate them, because
the wards have more than once been under our attention here. As regards the
attitude of King Hussein, he appears to alternate between tits of general amiability
and extreme sulkiness. When he is amiable all goes w T ell; when he is sulky he
threatens to abdicate. And there is this to be said about his threats of abdication,
that, being an elderly man and, I believe, addicted to religious pursuits, it is 1
conceivable that he might carry out his threats. Then we should be confronted
with a condition of affairs in which not only should we lose the advantage of his
personality, prestige, and general character, all of which are considerable, but we
should also be face to face with the warring jealousies both of his sons and of
their various rivals. Therefore 1 assume that our general policy must be guided
by the desirability, as far as possible, of keeping Hussein, of humouring him, and
retaining the advantage of his personality and spiritual authority, quite apart
from his political position, in the conditions that arise after the war. Into this
question comes .the minor issue of the title that he has been given, the further title
that he has assumed, and the new title, if such a one has to be discovered, which
should be conceded to him when all these new arrangements take place. I will
allude to that more specifically when we come to his claim to overlordship over the
whole of Arabia. The question of his exact title will be largely affected by the
decision arrived at about Mesopotamia, and before any final conclusion is come
to on that point we must await the views of the various communities in Irak,
which are being sought by our political officers there.
Now, as regards other European influences. The two Powers that are certain
to put forward claims in this respect are Prance and Italy. Earlier in the war,
about a year ago, the Foreign Office was in communication with the French, and
was endeavouring to negotiate a general Agreement with them, which reached the
stage of what is called a 'projet d'arrangement, but never got beyond that. That
draft Agreement, therefore, has no legal or juridical value, but it has to be borne i
in mind that, while it contained several features unfavourable, and unpalatable to
ourselves, it did on the other hand contain on the part of the French, what had
already figured in previous correspondence, namely, a definite admission of our
superior political interests in Arabia. That must be the basis upon which we shall
argue in any discussions with the French.
But if we look at the matter rather more closely, I do not think it is difficult to
form some kind of idea as to the lines upon which we should proceed. First comes the
very important question—on which there appears to be some difference of opinion
between the Foreign Office and the India Office—whether, assuming that we are
conceded a superiority of political interest in Arabia generally, we ought to translate
that into any claim to have charge of the political relations of the King of the Hejaz.
In some of the Foreign Office Papers I think I detected an inclination to press
that his political relations should be in our hands. The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , on the other
hand, dissuade that attitude, and I am disposed to think that there would be con
siderable difficulty in pressing successfully for it. Very great jealousy will be
aroused by any arrangement we make with King Hussein. Special claims for our
selves there will be met by corresponding claims on the part of some of our Allies
for similar positions there or elsewhere, and I am not certain that, as suggested