Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎212v] (424/544)

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rather than towards him. The Committee will remember that a week or two ago
we sent out telegrams to Captain Wilson, asking him to consult Miss Bell and
others, and soliciting an opinion from the various communities there as to whether
they did or did not favour a single Arab State, and, if they did, whether they would
like if to be under the suzerainty, nominal or otherwise, of one of the sons of the
King of the Hejaz. It was indicated at that time that there was a local feeling
(which I, for my part, was inclined to think might grow) in favour of Abdullah.
Since then we have been told in Captain Wilson’s telegrams (which are seen by
Miss Bell, to whose Opinion we attach great value, and reflect her view as well as
Captain Wilson’s) that there is an increasing reluctance on the part of Mesopotamia
to have anything to do with the Sherif at all.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I thinE they indicate rather an increasing desire
that they should be under British control.
LORD CURZON: That may be. That is Captain Wilson’s own view; he looks
at the case from the point of view of a British protectorate.
MR. SHUCKBURGH: There is a new telegram to-day, which is a kind of
ad interim reply to our enquiry. Captain Wilson has tried several districts, and
they are all dead against an Arab Amir at all. They do not want anybody at all.
They want to have one State, and do not want to be ruled over by any Arab Amir.
They say they have not escaped from the tyranny of the Turk in order to be submitted
to the tyranny of the Arab.
LORD CURZON: That is significant, and we will deal with it later. Your
last remark brings me to what I intended to be my concluding observation. It is a
point which lias not been sufficiently made here before. You were saying that these
people do not want to exchange Turkish rule for the Arab rule, the Turkish Sultan
for an Arab Amir. Have we sufficiently considered the possible danger of creating
a great Arabian State in the whole of these countries—viewed not merely by itself,
but in its possible relation to what may be happening further north? The most
difficult aspect of the Caucasian case is the Tartar and the Turki element there.
Many of us view with great apprehension, although we do not know how we are to
avoid it, the creation of some sort of Turkish autonomous State in the regions of the
Caucasus. I am speaking of the neighbourhood of Baku, Azerbaijan, and so on.
If such a State is set up, we know exactly what its ambitions will be. It will
endeavour to absorb Persian Azerbaijan, it will seek to create a fresh nucleus of
Turkish feeling and agitation in that part of the world. Putting aside the ethno
graphical aspect of the case, and looking to the religious aspect alone, there will be
an attempt to create a great Moslem community there. Would it be altogether wise,
on the southern side of that' area, to set up by any action of our own, or by the use of
our influence in that quarter, what will be another great Moslem community ? It
is true the Arabs are different from the Turks. The Arabs of Lower Mesopotamia
are Shiahs, whereas the bulk of the Turks are Sunnis, but if we do anything pre
maturely to build up a great Arab State under a single head we may rue the day,
and in the future we might find there had been evolved a great community, though
not necessarily under a single head, based upon principles of a fanatical and very
likely an aggressive form of Islam, which might become a serious danger. Thinking
over this matter, I am inclined to feel that the solution of these difficulties does
not lie in encouraging King Hussein to the kind of position to which he aspires,
but rather the reverse. I think that is all I need say in opening the case about
Hussein. There are twenty different facets of it which I might discuss, but I
have limited myself to the broad considerations underlying the whole of our policy,
whatever form it may ultimately take.
MR. MONTAGU: There is one thing I should like to ask. In discussing
Hussein’s relations to Mesopotamia, your remarks apply with equal force to his
relations to Ibn Saud, the Idrisi, and all the people in the south?
LORD CURZON: As you know, we are proceeding on what is a rather arbi
trary division into geographical areas. I was dealing with King Hussein apart,
because T was going to take later on—perhaps not to-day—the question of the whole
of these other chiefs, not only round the Gulf, but in the interior, including Ibn
Saud. Of course, the relationship of the two is close