Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎195v] (390/544)

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to be arrived at at the Peace Conference, it is probable that one of the Great Powers
may be appointed the provisional tutelar Power of this region. 4. That it is undesirable
on broad grounds of policy and strategy that that Power should be France. 5. That
the United States may be invited, but appears unlikely to undertake, and should not
be encouraged to undertake, responsibilities for the Caucasus. All this, of course, is
merely thrown out very generally. Then 6. That if there be a mandatory Power,
subject to the invitation of the States concerned, or of the League of Nations, it should
preferably be Great Britain. 7. That pending the creation of a stable Government or
Governments in these regions, a temporary military occupation may be found necessary.
8. that inasmuch as this force is already provided by the British, and as the Caucasus
falls, in the scheme of partition laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of December
1917, into the British sphere, it should continue to be provided by them. 9. r l^iat the
British Government should also retain for the present the naval control of the Caspian.
10. I hat the ultimate settlement should provide for the declaration as free ports
of Batum, Poti, Trebizond, Baku, and for free transit on the railway from Batum to
Baku. 11. That if a Tartar Kepublic be recognised in the Eastern Caucasus, special
steps may require to be taken for the administration of Baku. 12. That it is desirable
—and here is the disputable proposition—to retain the separate political existence of
Prussian, as distinguished from Turkish, Armenia. 13. That in the reconstitution of
Georgia it is desirable to include within its boundaries the Moslem Georgians of
Batum and of Lazistan. That is a point that conies out very strongly in the reports
of Stevens and others, that although the inhabitants of Batum are Moslems by
religion, having been forcibly converted some centuries ago, they are Georgian in race.
The same applies to the strip along the southern coast of the Black Sea, in which
Trebizond lies, which, as I pointed out, is not an Armenian vilayet at all—indeed the
Armenians are in a decided minority—but is inhabited by a Moslem population, and
has, until the collapse of the last few months, been under Turkish rule, but is inhabited
by people of Georgian race. Then 14. That it is desirable that the mandatory Power
for Armenia should be either France or the United States of America—by “ Armenia ”
I mean Armenia exclusive of the reservations I have made—and that Great Britain
should put forward no claims for this position. That is merely a rough summary.
LORD BOBERT CECIL: Before we assent to the broad lines of this settlement,
let us consider. I confess that it seems to me to be a very doubtful advantage.
We are going to say that France—because I think we may rule out America, much as
I should like to see her there
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LORI) CURZON : Which point are you discussing ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : The whole of the settlement. Take for the moment
the whole settlement. We propose that the six vilayets should be an Armenia, and
that it should be under the protection of either France or America. If it is under the
protection of America, then very grave difficulties arise elsewhere, but I will not
deal with that point, because I want to take the hypothesis that it becomes French.
Then you are going to have a French Armenia. The General Staff says, as I understand,
that the French, with their military talents, will be able to raise, if they like, a
very important force from Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. and Armenia itself, and may become quite a
formidable military force there. Then it is suggested that Georgia and Daghestan
should be independent—we are all agreed as to that—but that they should be under
our control and protection : that is to say, we shall be chargeable with the defence of
Georgia and Daghestan if there is any attack made upon them. What that means is*
this, that we have to keep a very considerable force ready to protect Georgia and
Daghestan against any attack from the French, which, by hypothesis, mav be a very serious
matter. We shall have a perpetual friction there. However you settle the boundaries
there will be the greatest possible indignation that more has not been included in one
or the other, and I thought it was one of the main propositions laid down by Lord
Curzon last week—to which 1 thought w T e agreed—that whoever had Armenia must
have these Caucasian districts, for the very reason that the burden of defending them
would be so terrific. If we only had that little strip which we could only approach
from the Black Sea it would be the only way we could get at it, and for us to
undertake to defend that against a formidable military attack on the Armenians ,
would be a very serious matter, besides being difficult to defend. That seems
to me to be a very doubtful proposition. It may be right, but I should have
thought that it was wrong myself. The Georgians and Daghestanis are going to be
a troublesome body, I agree, but I do not myself quite see our being made responsible