Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎196r] (391/544)

9
[365—38]
D
tor their defence, because that is the whale basis of the General Stall paper, a
regenerated Russia on the north and a militarised Armenia on the south. I think it
would he an appalling position to be put into, and I cannot conceive what the real
reason for it is. We say this is part of the route to India. So it is. The railway from
Batum to Baku is a very important link in that particular route to India. If we have
the control of the Black Sea that is all right, and nobody can go to Batum without our
leave. If we have not, then .we evidently cannot defend Georgia at all. If we have
got the control of the Caspian, which I think we ought to retain, and also cut off that
route a little farther on, it seems to me our proper course is to abide by our traditional
policy, to go in for supremacy on the sea in the Black Sea and the Caspian, and let
anybody who likes have the intervening bit of land, which does not matter to us at all.
That seems to be what we have thought from a political point of view. The difficulty
appears to be very great if we ask for Georgia, Daghestan, and Azerbaijan. That is a
perfectly new demand which we have never made, and it will greatly hamper any
possible solution of the very difficult questions that are going to arise in the Arab
countries, which we all know of and to which 1 need not refer.
LORD CURZON : I do not argue the military side of the case ; the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff will do that. I am putting in a caveat against your interpre
tation, or rather misinterpretation, of what I meant. In the first place you say again
that you deprecate our making such a demand. I did not anticipate that any demand
would come from us at all. Rather, I anticipated that the line would be this, that,
however reluctant, we might be made to act in these regions. If we were to assume this
role in the Caucasian regions north and south of the railway, and were to take over the
responsibility of protecting these regions for all time against a possible attack by
hostile forces in French Armenia, things would be very different. But that is not the
proposition. In the Caucasus you have a good deal of ferment and unrest, and you
have these small communities struggling into existence. It is tolerably clear that they
cannot establish their autonomous life by themselves. Military occupation is for the
time being in existence, and it must for some time be necessary. I do not know whether
you contemplate that our military forces there should be reinforced or replaced by the
forces of other Powers. Indeed, 1 think that the other day, when I or somebody ,
suggested a joint military occupation, you or some other speaker pointed out the
disadvantages. Let us assume, therefore, that the garrison, being required for a time,
is provided by ourselves. 1 assume that that garrison will probably require to remain
in occupation of the line from Batum to Baku, and possibly of the two capitals at either
end. and of Tiflis in the centre, for a period of time—how long I cannot say, whether
one or more years. I should have thought that in their own interests this would have
been demanded by the people themselves. Meanwhile, these States having asked for a
mandatory, on my hypothesis, and having chosen us as the mandatory, for they are at
liberty to do so, if we are willing to take it, tbey will be organising their strength and
the development of their national existence. In a few years’ time they will either be
strong enough to stand by themselves, as I hope and believe they will be, or else, on the
hypothesis that Russia recovers in the interval, they might go back to Russia. There
fore the idea that we are to assume indefinite military responsibility is not one which
entered my head, and I entirely repudiate it. I do not contemplate a state of affairs
in which we, with inferior forces in the Caucasus, thousands of miles from our base,
should be confronted by a great military force raised by the French in Armenia which
will come into collision with us.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I do not understand the purpose of going there at all.
The whole theory of the General* Staff paper, as I understand, is that there may be a
danger of a French occupation of this district. If that is not the theory then I do not
understand it. That is the whole theory, and if that danger is to exist we must be
there to stop it, and that is the whole purpose of our being there. I do not understand
what the point is otherwise.
LORD CURZON : The military theory is this, although it is not for me to
expound it in the presence of General Wilson. France will acquire considerable
strength and momentum bv being in Armenia, and that strength and momentum will
increase to our detriment if they have the manhood, the resources, and the railways of
the Caucasus in addition.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : They will never get that.
LORD CURZON : Why ?