Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎125v] (250/544)

(Div.)
APPENDIX III.
(E.C.-1658.)
PERSIA.
Sir P. Cox to Mr. Balfour.—{deceived September 24, 8 a.m.)
Tehran, September 2o. 1918.
(No. 831. Urgent.) (September 23, il'30 a.m.) ,
I HAVE discussed situation very fully and frankly with Prime Minister and
Mosrat Dowleh, his principal ally in the Cabinet, at two or three meetings. Following
is an epitome of what has passed, and of solution which presents itself to us:—
At outset I should explain that fall of Baku and retirement of our force from there
and Zenjan line, respectively, has had very deleterious effect on public opinion at
Tehran and elsewhere. It has, moreover, given hostile element an opportunity of
revival of violent anti-British propaganda, which brought about considerable run on the
Imperial Bank of Persia, and has greatly shaken position of the Cabinet. Although it
is dillicult to conceive, in view of very favourable trend of operations in Europe, how
any intelligent Persian can now dream of entering war on the side of the enemy, yet I
am instructed by reliable elements here that, were we to suffer any further set-backs in
North-West Persia, the pro-Turk and pro-German factions, stimulated by enemy’s
propaganda, would undoubtedly turn out present Cabinet and replace it with an
extremist one, which would certainly drag the country into the war on the side of the
enemy. It is especially considered that if the Turks succeeded in ejecting us from
Kasvin and occupying Tehran they would have no difficulty in forcing Persia to come
in on their side.
Having previously communicated with General Officer Commanding, Bagdad, I
informed Cabinet in strict confidence what force we actually had this side of
Kermanshah ; what reinforcements were on the way ; and what more might be expected
before the winter sets in. I also informed them that our troops would do their utmost
to hold on to Enzeli, Resht, Zenjan, Senueh, and especially Kasvin. On the above
premises we discussed pros and cons of Persia coming in on our side or becoming
[? more] benevolently neutral, or remaining neutral but secretly benevolent as at
present. While asserting their complete readiness to come in if we could put three or
even two divisions into the country [group undecypherable] arrived unhesitatingly at
the conclusion that, if practical ability of General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia,
was limited to extent stated by me, it would be dangerous for Persia to come into the
war, and she must decide on the policy of neutrality in some form. But it was held
that even if it was desired merely to maintain neutrality with moderate and secret
benevolence to us, as at present, it would be impossible for present Cabinet to maintain
its position in present critical circumstances unless they were enabled to attract
moderate democratic elements, and create atmosphere favourable to us by some public
announcement of friendly concession which they had been able to secure from us.
By this means they would be able to pose as a “ popular ” Cabinet.
What thej 7 would like to make known if we agree would be:—
1. That Great Britain has categorically reiterated its determination to respect
independence of Persia.
2. That she has undertaken as soon as a Russian Government exists which she
can recognise to press for abrogation of Anglo-Russian Convention.
3. That she has consented, firstly, to transfer to direct control of Persian
Government South Persia Rifles; secondly, despatch to Tehran as soon as it can be
arranged of a commission of neutral officers, preferably Scandinavian, but not Swedes
to draw up scheme for formation of a uniform force for Persia, into which present
South Persia Rifles would be merged. Meanwhile, for period of the war, Shiraz South
Persiii Rifles would be transferred to the control of Farman Farma, who (in accordance
with a private understanding between the two Governments) would himself ask and
receive permission to retain adequate number of British personnel to administer force.
In this connection it is stipulated that such officers should not be so senior (such as
Sir P. Sykes or even Colonel Stokes) as to enable critics to say that real control still
remained British. In suggested communique no mention would be made of South
Persia Rifles in Kerman, but there would be understanding between the two