Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎126r] (251/544)

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Governments that, if Fars arrangement succeeded, Kerman should follow suit later on.
It is to be understood that as soon as Bushire-Shiraz road has been opened up, and
tranquillity restored, British troops at bars would be gradually withdrawn.
Assuming for the moment that His Majesty’s Government would agree to issue of
a communique on the above lines in order to ensure maintenance of the present Cabinet
with a policy of neutrality and a friendly attitude of the Persian people towards
Great Britain, we proceeded to discuss precise means by which neutrality and interest
of Persia could be best safeguarded.
Following course of action is suggested for consideration:—
After issue of proposed communique Persia would at once address [? draft note]s
to both belligerents, appealing to them to withdraw their troops from Persian soil, and
not to make heart of Persia the cockpit of their struggle. Turkey would obviously
refuse to comply, as she could not give up Aizerbaijan, and Great Britain would, in
view of Turkish attitude, refuse likewise. Persia would then propose that a [? zone]
or topographical boundary (to be selected in consultation with us) should be agreed
upon, across which neither [? belligerent] would advance. It is considered attitude of
Turkey in the above negotiations is sure to be unfriendly, and thus public opinion will
be the more inclined to us, with result that Persian neutrality will become more and
more benevolent to ns in direction advocated by Government of India.
Two Ministers above mentioned have still to discuss with some of their colleagues
and Shah, but are confident of their acquiescence. •
In view of actual run on Imperial Bank of Persia, a possibility of further Turkish
advance in the near future, either on Enzeli or Zenjan, it will be realised that if
present Cabinet is to be [? maintained j communique above suggested must be issued
without delay. I shall be grateful, therefore, if I can be informed as soon as possible
how far course of action above outlined commends itself to His Majesty’s Government.
(Kepeated to India and Bagdad.)
APPENDIX IV.
<D. 6.) • (E.C.-1675.)
EASTERN COMMITTEE.
The following paper is written with a view to placing on record what has
occurred recently in North-West Persia and on the shores of the Caspian in regard
to the responsibilities of control of operations by the authorities concerned, both at
« home and in Mesopotamia, and to review the share taken therein by General
Dimsterville and his mission:—
f I .—Original Object of Dunsterville's Mission.
General Dunsterville’s original mission did not include the British troops
subsequently placed under his command, but was to consist of 100 to 150 officers and
200 to 300 N.GO.’s.
His orders were to proceed to Tiflis, in the first instance, and the main military
objective was to maintain an effective force on the Caucasus front, so as to—
(a.) Protect occupied portions of Turkish Armenia;
\b.) Prevent the realisation of Pan-Turanian designs; and
(c.) By holding as many enemy forces as possible in the Caucasus, and also by
helping to cover his right flank on the Persian frontier, indirectly assist
Marshall in Mesopotamia.
He was instructed to render every assistance to the Caucasus Government, more
especially as regards raising, training, and equipping their military forces.
The intervention of the Jungalis and the Bolsheviks in the neighbourhood of
Enzeli, however, prevented him at the start from attaining above objectives.