Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎125r] (249/544)

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4. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to give their good offices to both
parties on behalf of such a reconciliation and an amicable adjustment of their out
standing difficulties: but they cannot but feel that the present time of war and
stress is unfavourable to a final settlement of complicated questions such as exact
delimitation of boundaries.
5. In the meantime, all Arab leaders should combine against the common
enemy, and in their dealings with each other should exercise patience and concilia
tion, and use every endeavour to localise disputes.
6. We will rectify the blockade arrangements in some manner acceptable to Bin
Sand, or if unable to do so, will not hold him responsible for leakage of supplies.
7. We will see that Bin Sand’s material resources do not suffer by reason of
any hostilities undertaken by him on our behalf.
Bin Sand's Reply.
A. With reference to clause 2, he objects strongly to King Husain being allowed
to attack Khurma, and points out that, even if he withdrew his own objection, the
people of Nejd would not accept the position. He specifically disclaims respon
sibility if the matter is allowed to go further.
B. As regards King Husain’s offer to visit him (clause 3), Bin Sand expresses
appreciation and gratitude, and is ready to meet the King; but he doubts whether
such an expedition on the part of the latter may not be used as a cloak for the
collection of forces with the object of subsequent diversion against Khurma. Bin
Sand, therefore, desires the following conditions to be attached to the visit :—
(i.) The King to come with the minimum following necessary to maintain his
dignity; and
(ii.) A responsible British officer to accompanv him.
APPENDIX II.
(l).vii.) (E.C.-1664.)
TELEGRAM FROM ADMIRALTY TO C.-IN-C., EAST INDIES, REPEATED
TO S.N.O., BAGHDAD, FOR COMMODORE NORRIS, 24.9.18.
Our policy regarding gaining control of Caspian fleet does not seem to be
clearly understood by Commodore Norris. In consultation with War Office,
Admiralty consider that the time for parleying and peaceful bargaining has come
to an end and drastic measures must now be taken. Steps should at once be taken,
in consultation with Military authorities, to obtain possession of the armed Caspian
fleet, either by bribing captains and crews, or by purchase outright. If this can be
done all remaining Caspian shipping should be captured or sunk. If these methods
fail we must seize all shipping at Enzeli, and after arming a sufficient number of
vessels must embark on a campaign of capturing or sinking all Caspian ships, both
armed and unarmed, that refuse to work under our orders. The means at your, and
Commodore’s, disposal seem sufficient for this. The great importance to us and
India of the Caspian fleet and shipping renders vigorous and immediate action
most necessary. War Office concurs in these views, and are sending similar
instructions to^G.-O.-C., Mesopotamia, and directing him to give Commodore every
assistance. War Office are also asking G.-O.-C., Mesopotamia, to telegraph a
definite statement of funds necessary for control or purchase as early as possible.