Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎117v] (234/544)

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will give us the power to maintain the initiative which, if we have not temporarily lost,
we have been perilously near losing in the Caspian theatre.
(g.) Your paragraph 9. The extension of the Nushki railway to Mirjawa has
undoubtedly proved of the greatest value, but with the present acute shortage of rails,
I consider that any extension beyond that already sanctioned is inadmissible. Even the
extension to Neh (requiring eight months for completion) would still not enable you to
maintain any considerable force on the Kusso-Persian frontier. On the other hand,
every mile of railway extension along the Khanikin-Kermanshah route is having an
almost immediate effect on the Caspian situation, while a comparatively short railway
extension up the Tigris would facilitate operations which might deprive the Turks of
their initiative in North-West Persia.
(h.) Your paragraph 10. India shares her railway difficulties with all the belli
gerent countries of Europe, and this situation cannot be remedied while all available
material is required for the prosecution of the war; but speaking generally, I regard
strategic railways for North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. mobilisation as of greater importance than
the Mirjawa extension.
(j.) Your paragraph 11. (a.) Agree. (6.) Has already been considered and found
unsuitable, (c), (d), and (e). It is, and will remain, impossible for us to exercise strong
military pressure from Meshed. It must therefore be recognised that should India be
seriously threatened the main line of defence must be established on the North-West
frontier of India and not on the Itusso-Persian frontier. The further extension of the
Mirjawa railway is inadmissible owing to shortage of material, and even were this not
so, it would prove ineffective within such a time as it is necessary to consider.
APPENDIX (C).
The Military Command in the Middle East.
Memorandum by Lieutenant-General Smuts.
I regard the military situation in the Middle East as very unsatisfactory. While
on all other fronts we are holding or driving back the enemy, his advance in the
Caucasus, Trans-Caspia, and North-West Persia continues. And this is a matter which
in a very special degree concerns the British Empire and its future in Asia. If the
enemy reaches Central Persia and Afghanistan next summer, a situation might arise on
the Indian frontier which would cripple our military effort from Palestine and Salonica
to Central Asia.
From this point of view our holding of the Baghdad-Hamadan-Enzeli line and
denial of the Caspian to the enemy is a matter of cardinal importance. Baku is almost
certain to be lost, but that does not mean the loss of the Caspian. If we can hold on to
Enzeli and Krasnovodsk and obtain control of, at any rate, a portion of the Caspian
fleet, while our friends in Russia hold Petrovsk and Astrakhan, an enemy advance
across the Caspian and towards the centre of Persia and the border of Afghanistan will
be prevented. Once this situation is definitely stabilised, a blow might be struck
against the Turks at Mosul which would have far-reaching results.
The misfortune is that our commanders in that area are either incompetent, or will
not or cannot grasp the situation. Dunsterville was sent to Baku to obtain control of
the Caspian fleet, but his efforts have mostly gone to waste in another direction.
General Marshall, again, good military commander as he is, does not seem to realise the
larger and wider strategy of the enemy, which has denuded his Tigris front of troops
and is outflanking his whole position in .Mesopotamia by a great movement to Persia
and Trans-Caspia. His eyes are kept unmovably fixed on the Tigris front, which has for
the moment lost all importance. He has been most dilatory in moving troops towards
the Caspian, and he now proposes to withdraw his troops from Fnzeli westwards in
order to meet the Turkish meuance from the direction of Tabriz. If Enzeli is evacuated
we could not hope to hold out at Krasnovodsk, and the Caspian route will fall com
pletely under enemy control and the menace to Afghanistan will at once become serious.
General Marshall has all along exaggerated his transport difficulties. At first he could
only maintain 1,000 infantry on motor cars; later he found he could maintain an