Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎118r] (235/544)

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infantry brigade, and I am under the impression that he has not grappled seriously
with the situation, just because he does not realise our dangers in that area and the
strategy to be followed.
The Government of India, realising the grave dangers and the necessity for a
unified command over that vast area, has proposed that the conduct of operations shall
be put under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India. This the War Office
could not, for good and sufficient reasons, agree to. But I feel sure unity of command
in the Middle East is necessary, as all moves and operations in Mesopotania, Persia,
and Turkestan will henceforth be interdependent. This command should, however,
remain direct under the War Office. The solution I would propose is the following:—
I have been struck for months now by the insight which Sir Charles Monro has
shown into the military situation in that vast theatre. His judgments have been mostly
sound and sure, while those of General Marshall have inspired me with no confidence.
I would suggest that Sir Charles Monro vacate his position as Commander-in-Chief in
India and be given the entire command from Baghdad to Meshed. As Commander in-
Chief in India shoidd be appointed a man who will work in close harmony with him.
For General Marshall another suitable sphere of work should be found; I do not think
he has the strategic mind to cope with the situation now developing in the East.
Events are moving fast, and whatever is done should be done quickly.
(Initialled) J. C. S.
September 16, 1918.
APPENDIX (D).
Copy of a Letter from Lord R. Cecil to Mr. Balfour.
My dear Arthur, Gale y Chelwood Gate, Uchfield, September 15, 1918.
I am very uneasy about the direction of our military affairs in the Middle East.
At present the chief authority is the General Staff here. It acts through Marshall
who is at Baghdad—not much nearer to the Persian and Trans-Caspian operations
than we are. He in turn acts through Dunsterville, who is at present shut up in Baku.
No doubt some officer is in charge of operations in North-West Persia, though I
don’t know who he is. Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief in India has apparently
the right to give general advice in Baghdad and Persia without going through the
General Staff here. How far he is subject to the Indian Government I do not know.
Beyond the Caspian things are, if possible, worse. Krasnovodsk is sometimes under
Dunsterville and sometimes under Malleson. I really do not know which at the present
moment. Malleson takes his orders from the Government of India. 1 do not know
how' far his command extends. Does he control Meshed or Mirjawa ? How far East
does his authority reach ? Kashghar is, I gather, certainly beyond him.
In Persia there is an even more complex situation. The North-West is under the
War Office; Teheran, being controlled by Persian forces, is under the influence of
Marling and therefore of the Foreign Office. Colonel Haig, at Ispahan, is an Indian
official. I am not sure whether he has any direct military authority. Sir Percy Sykes
is also an Indian official and commands the South-Persian Rifles. Who commands the
Indian troops? I am not sure. There was some talk of a Brigadier, but I doubt if he
materialised. Then there are troops (I think) at Bunder Abbas, and a small expedition
going up towards Shiraz from Bushire. The latter are, I understand, under the
command of General Douglas who is, I think, but am not sure, an officer of General
Marshall’s force. If I have read the telegrams rightly his force, should it be unopposed,
would or might cease to be regarded as a military contingent and would become a
police force and would then be under the direction of the 1 ohtical Othcei at Shiraz, that
is, of the Indian Government.
I may have exaggerated the confusion of authority, for I am writing without
means of reference. But I am sure that substantially I am right. On the top of all
comes the Eastern Committee, meeting once or twice a week and feeling itself competent
to decide such questions as to whether General Dunsterville should be continued in his
command, and should Baku be held or abandoned.
Finally, there is the Admiralty, not a member of the Eastern Committee at all,
which directs through Captain Norris the operations on the Caspian which, apait tiom
other things, constitutes a vital link in our military communications.