Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎117r] (233/544)

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monsoon and the consequent need for heavy internal movements of foodstuffs, will be
even graver than anticipated.
11. To sum up—
(a.) There seems to be indication that Germany may attempt in the course of 1919
or earlier further aggression in the East.
(b.) The control of policy and strategy in the eastern theatres should be centralised
in India, subject of course to orders of His Majesty’s Government, and
there should be unity of command in North Persia.
(c.) The best method of checking a German advance, having as its objective the
frontiers of Afghanistan with the consequent menace to the safety of India,
would be to obtain control of North-West Persia and the Caspian.
(d.) Failing this course, it is absolutely necessary that we should be in a position
to exercise strong military pressure from Meshed.
(e.) This demands the extension of the railway northwards from Mirjawa.
APPENDIX (B).
G.I.G.S. to C.-in-C., India.
(a.) I welcome the clear expression of your views conveyed in your telegram
No. 66078, 21st August.
(b.) Your paragraph 3. It appears probable that Germany may seek to shorten
her line in the West so that she may be able to dispose of a large reserve. Where
these reserves will be employed is, however, a matter of doubt. It is certain they will
be required on the Western front as soon as operations commence next year, and it is
consequently only during the four or four and a half months from the middle or end of
October to the beginning of March that they can be employed in any other theatre*
This period is too short to enable any large force to be transported to Irans-Caspia,
engaged there, and brought back to France.
(c.) Your paragraph 5. A very similar proposal was minutely examined in August
by War Cabinet Committee. Arguments almost identical with those adduced by you
were carefully considered, but a proposal to depart from the present arrangements for
military control was unequivocally withdrawn on realisation of the interdependence of
all theatres in this war, and that unity of command as proposed by you in the East
could only be attained at the sacrifice of unity of direction of strategic resources of the
Empire as a whole. It was fully appreciated that such direction is dependent upon
the continuance to afford me in your sphere the loyal co-operation which I have always
received in the past, and which I know I can count on for the future.
(d.) Your paragraph 6. I am in favour of the formation of a Caspian Command
to include all troops on the Caspian littoral and North-West Persia, but it appears
essential that this command should be under Marshall, who should decide its actual
composition and sphere of action, for its operations will be carried out by troops found
from General Marshall’s command, of which it will be an integral part. Mallesons
command is affected to a relatively small extent and is, therefore, excluded from the
proposed Caspian Command.
(c.) Your paragraph 7. I agree that Germany might prefer the attempt to secure
control of the Caspian with a view to threatening Afghanistan and India. W e must,
however, avoid playing the enemy’s game by allowing our stratagy to be diverted from
its true course by a German demonstration in Trans-Caspia, and should bear in mind
the conflict between German and Turkish interests.
(/.) Your paragraph 8. I agree that it is desirable to check any possible enemy
advances as far West as practicable, but the development of the Caspian situation has
shown clearly that owing to our undeveloped communications we cannot depend yet
upon direct intervention from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Any intervention from this direction
must take the form of a flank attack from the Shatt-ab-Arab against the enemy right,
and until such an attack has had time to develop systematically, India must be
prepared to hold her own frontier in addition to maintaining internal security. Whether
Afghanistan is to be mobilised now as an advanced post or to be left to show her colours
on the appearance of the Turks on her frontier is, 1 consider, a question purely for the
consideration of the Indian Government. But it is the knowledge that India is able to
hold her own front (in addition to continuing to find drafts for other theatres) which