Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎116v] (232/544)

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central reserve determined. In order to envisage the eastern strategical situation as a
whole it is necessary that the headquarters should be accessible to the various theatres,
so that decisions may be based on periodical visits by the Commander or his Staff.
I suggest that London is too remote to permit of such central control being exercised
from there. It seems to me to follow that control must be centralised in India.
6. In the second place, and apart from the question of an Eastern Command,
great advantages would result from creating one North Persian Command immediately
subject to India. Under such a scheme Malleson and Dunsterville would both be
placed under this command, and would no longer be under the direct control of myself
and Marshall respectively.
7. Thirdly, should German}^ decide to attempt a fresh menace to our Eastern
Empire there is a choice of various immediate objectives. For instance, she may decide
to strike at our most vital point, namely, the Suez Canal. She may attempt to retake
Baghdad. She may aim at securing Baku, the key of the Caspian, and the mainspring of
the Transcaspian railway, from which she could threaten the security of India by stirring
up trouble in Afghanistan and on our frontiers.
In your telegram of the 12th July you state that enemy will spare no effort to
incite Afghanistan to hostility against us, and with this view 1 agree. Enemy’s
ultimate object, whatever line of attack she may decide upon, will, as you recognise, be
to embarrass India as being the reservoir in the East of men ' and supplies, and
thus prevent us from maintaining our forces in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Salonika,
which are in the main dependent on us.
Even if Germany does not contemplate serious aggression in any of these
directions, it would be sound economy, strategically and politically, for her to make
a demonstration in force with the objects of immobilising our forces, preventing possible
discouragement or even defection on the part of the Turks, and preparing for post-war
commercial rivalry.
8. Of the possible objects I can form no definite opinion as to which would be most
probable to commend itself to the enemy. It seems to me, however, that the saiest
course is to check any possible enemy advances as far west as practicable, and that it
would be better to deny enemy access to Baku and the western (three groups omitted)
close proximity to Afghanistan. This view seems to be in accordance with the policy of
His Majesty’s Government, which aims at denying the enemy access through North-West
Persia, and with the importance which in your telegram you attach to our obtaining
control of the Caspian. Meshed becomes a strategic centre of great importance it,
however, it is impracticable to check the enemy approach to Transcaspia.
9. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the ample railway communications leading
to the East which are at the disposal of Germany, and on our very backward condition
in this respect. It is for this reason that we urged in the first instance the necessity of
projecting the railway line to Mirjawa, and we now ask with equal insistence that the
railway should at once be extended northwards from Mirjaw-a (one group undecipherable),
Birjand, and Meshed. We believe this extension would be welcomed rather than
resented by Amir of Afghanistan. It accords more or less with the scheme he
propounded to Kabid Mission in 1904 for defence of Afghanistan against Russia;
and as w r e have now ample (one group undecipherable^ that Amir is pledged
to oppose by force any Turco-German troops attempting to enter Afghanistan, he will
welcome any measures on our side calculated to prevent such entry. ... I observe that
you anticipate that we should receive ample notice of any German-Turco movement
towards our frontiers. I wish to emphasise that, in view of our present deplorably
inadequate communications, ample notice means a very long period, probably not less
than a year. Our lorce in North-East Persia is not susceptible of expansion beyond its
present insignificant strength, owing to the primitive conditions of our communications.
The maintenance even of this small force makes most extravagant demands on animal
transport, which w r e cannot spare from the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , and yet a display of
British strength in that region would have far-reaching political and military
consequences.
10. We have already informed you that we shall require until the end of December
the whole of Tatas’ output of rails. Apart from the requirements of the Mirjawa
extension, we shall probably require large quantities of rails for sidings, &c., in
connection with the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. mobilisation scheme. I cannot too strongly
emphasise also the seriousness of the railway situation in India. Freeland has now
examined the position and fully realises our deficiencies in rails, locomotives, &c. His
considered opinion entirely confirms our view of the situation as reported in our telegram
of the 8th March, and this situation, owing to the prospects of a partial failure of the