Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎116r] (231/544)

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APPENDIX (A).
C.-in-C., India, to War Office. — (Despatched at 7 p.m., August 21, 1918. Received at
5 a.m., August 23, 1918.)
(66078 M.O. 1.)
REFERENCE your 62092 dated 12th July.
Operations 1. Owing to the rapid change being undergone by the strategical
situation both on the Western front and in the Caspian areas, I consider it desirable to
place before you a further expression of my views on the policy to be adopted in the
Eastern theatres.
2. You stated in your above-quoted telegram that you anticipated :—
(a.) That Marshall could rely on carrying out his policy uninterrupted by enemy,
but subject to limitations imposed by distances and transport problems.
(b.) That Germany will make no serious military effort in Asia until her main
effort in Europe is either suspended or collapses.
(c.) That our safest course is to adopt a bold policy in the East.
3. Though 1 am necessarily ignorant of the resources of the belligerents in material
and personnel, the recent successes of the Allies on the Marne and near Amiens point
to the initiative passing into our hands, and it seems possible that the result of this
season’s campaign in the West, coupled with the rapid development of the American
army in efficiency and numbers, may be a general withdrawal and shortening of the
German line and suspension of the latter’s main effort in Europe. The conditions
which in your telegram you postulated as antecedent to a serious military effort by
Germany in Asia will in that case have been realised, and we must take stock of our
capacity to deal with the strategical situation which may arise in consequence in the
East. It seems to me also possible that the Allied command may decide that an
attempt to force the German line on the Western front may be too costly an under
taking, and that it would consequently be a wiser policy, while holding the Germans in
the West, to select a theatre where German Eastern ambitions can be stifled effectively.
I note in this connection that you consider that both Turkish and German penetration
in Trans-Caspia or Caucasus is primarily economic and not military, and it appears to
follow that a check to their schemes in those areas would hasten their economic
downfall.
4. On the assumption that the war will continue in 1919, and that the strategical
centre of gravity may be transferred eastwards, for the reasons above stated, I desire
to submit for consideration my views as to the possibility of developments and the
measures which should, in my opinion, be taken to meet them.
5. 1 consider, in the first place, that the present diffusion of responsibility and
duality of control gravely impeding our decision and effective action both military and
political. There seems to be ample evidence of the strength which has accrued to the
Allied armies in Europe by the adoption of the principle of the united command.
It surely follows that united command and control are as equally desirable in the
East. Many instances where united command would have ensured more promptitude
of action and the adoption of a policy more in harmony with stategical requirements
could be cited. It will suffice to take as illustration of the situation in Central Arabia
and in Persia.
In Central Arabia present serious differences between Bin Saud and King Hussein
are aggravated by division of authority on which each party trades.
In Persia we have the Minister at Teheran, Marshall, Cox, Malleson, Dunster-
ville, and the Government of India all having a voice in guiding policy and suggesting
actions.
The result has been confusion of policy and delays in decision which threatened
recently to involve us in serious trouble from the Gulf to Caspian. For a multiplicity of
counsels does not tend to promote united thought and policy.
I therefore consider that efficiency would be largely increased were the forces in
theatres east of Suez formed into one group for military command and political control.
It would no doubt be preferable if Egypt could also be included, but the many delicate
international questions connected with that theatre presumably preclude such an
arrangement. The military situation in the East, however, even with Egypt excluded,
indicates the need of a centralised control from which the strength of the forces in
Persia and Mesopotamia and India can be despatched, and the size and location of a
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