Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎50v] (100/544)

6
in that country. Ine position to-day was that the Persian Govern
ment was changing, tnat we found great difficulty in reinforcing
our troops, and that the tribes were rendered restless by the
presence of our troops as well as by enemy agents. We had now
strengthened our Hama dan cordon and he proposed that we should
tell Teheran that, if a Persian Government would come in as our
ally to the extent of keeping out Turkish forces and removing
German agents, we would not concern ourselves any more with the
South Persia Rifles; we would strengthen our cordon and give
Persia all the assistance we could. He invited the Committee to
refer to a paper by Mr. Oliphant (E.C.-526) recording an interest
ing conversation with the Persian Minister. He had in his hand
the draft of a telegram prepared at the Foreign Office, and based
on that conversation. He had three comments to make upon this
draft: first, that Marling should let it be known in Teheran that
we were ready to enter into negotiations with any friendly Persian
Government about the South Persia Rifles. He himself main
tained that we could obtain a Government friendly to us by
declaring our readiness to hand over the force at once. Secondly,
there was nothing in the draft about an alliance; and thirdly,
nothing was said about the expulsion of Wassmuss. He main
tained that we must get Persia definitely on our side by a formal
treaty, so that if the Germans attacked, our position would be
that of going to the assistance of “ our brave allies." We ought
to tell Marling that we attach real importance to getting the
Persian Government on our side, and that, to achieve this, he
should use the South Persia Rifles for purposes of bargaining.
The Chairman said that there were several questions arising
out of Mr. Montagu’s proposal. The South Persia Rifles were
nominally a Persian force, but they were not recognised by the
Persian Government, who were always contending for two things,
that the South Persia Rifles should be under the Persian Govern
ment, and that they should be officered by neutrals after the war.
He pointed out the danger of handing over as many as 6,000
armed men, who might even join hands with Wassmuss, and who .
would almost certainly roam about Southern Persia, looting. We
must have a guarantee as to their behaviour during the war, and
it was desirable, therefore, that they should be kept in existence,
at any rate on the side of Kerman. Again, if they were to con
tinue to exist, they must have a commander, and who should this
commander be? He himself had sometimes regretted that Colonel
Stokes, rather than Sir P. Sykes, had not been given the appoint
ment. Incidentally he thought that if we made any proposals to
the Persian Government, we might employ Stokes, who was a
persona grata with the Persians. Again, if we handed over the
South Persia Rifles to the Persian Government, who would pay
them? It was not to be expected that we should go on paying
them, and yet relinquish our control. Further, as to the terms to
be made, what was it proposed to do with Sir P. Sykes? He had
been 20-30 years in Persia, where he was liked, though the Chair
man believed that he was regarded by the democratic party in
Persia as unfavourable to Persian nationalism. Also, what was to
happen at Teheran? A complete change of policy had been sug
gested: was Sir C. Marling the right man to carry it out, since he
was regarded by the Persians as the leading exponent of the Anglo-
Russian Convention School? We had also to consider the attitude
of the Persian Government towards the Anglo-Russian Conven
tion. We had announced that we regarded the treaty as in sus
pense, but in the absence of a stable Russian Government had
refrained from'abrogating it at once. Was there any good reason
why it should not be frankly denounced, as it was already quite
dead? W e had then to consider what would become of our regulars
in South Persia, where much disorder would ensue if we created,
and left, a vacuum. The Persian Minister, in his interview with