Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎51r] (101/544)

Mr. Oliphant, had more than once repeated that it was essential
that our troops should remain in terrorem, in view of possible even
tualities at Shiraz. If we decided to seek an alliance with Persia,
one of our conditions must certainly be that Wassmuss must be got
rid of. Another condition would be the withdrawal of Sou let.
The Chairman suggested, therefore, that Marling should be
accpiainted with the views of the Eastern Committee, and that all
these aspects of the case should be put before him, and his com
ments invited. As regards the political situation in Teheran,
Marling in his telegrams had apparently acted on the hypothesis
(a) that the new Prime Minister would be Vossugh, (b) that
Vossugh could easily be placed in office, and (c) that Marling
would bring pressure to bear on the Shah to have Vossugh invited
to form a Cabinet. The facts to-day were, that a Bakhtiari
Cabinet was in power.
Mr. Balfour said that he agreed with the Chairman's views
of the case if the Committee were agreed that they should adopt
the policy suggested by Mr. Montagu. To adopt it was tempting,
but he was not certain that he understood it aright. Persia was
to be asked to become our ally, but it was absurd to think that
Persia could keep out the Turks or the Germans. The alliance,
therefore was already based upon British bayonets, as Persia
could give us no real military assistance. The policy would commit
us to the recovery of Azerbaijan, and Mr. Balfour doubted
whether, in this respect, we could carry out our part of the
bargain. We would be asking a practically helpless country to
come in on our side. He would like, before dealing with the
Chairman’s subsidiary points, to be quite clear as to the views of
the Committee on fundamental questions.
The Chairman said that he himself only contemplated a
friendly Persian Government, and a possible new way of making
. that Government friendly.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that if Persia engaged to turn out
German agents, she would thereby adopt an unneutral attitude
towards Germany, with whom she might find herself, in conse
quence, at war.
The Chairman said he agreed with Mr. Balfour, that one of
Persia’s conditions for a positive alliance would probably be that
we should assist her to recover her fairest province, Azerbaijan;
were we in a position to carry out an engagement of this kind?
General Macdonogh said that although a state of war between
Germany and Persia did not exist, we were raising Persian levies
and irregulars to stem the German advance, and Tabriz was
already in the hands of the Turks.
General Smuts thought it might be dangerous if we saddled
ourselves with an alliance with Persia. Mr. Montagu’s policy was
to clear out of South Persia. This policy might be successful, but
to contract an alliance on that basis was a serious consideration.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that the Committee had already
expressed itself as not unfavourable to an alliance, and that in
any case, whether an alliance was concluded or not, we should be
compelled to defend Persia. Besides, if no alliance were formed,
we should be getting a wholly inadequate return for the surrender
of the South Persia Rifles—merely a vague friendship, with dis
banded troops, and Wassmuss creating trouble in the south.
The Chairman said that the Committee wished to get Persia
on to our side. To secure this object, a score of different ways had
already been tried. They were now considering whether we might
not go further than before, e.g., hand over the South Persia.
Rifles, abrogate the Anglo-Russian Convention, and so on.
Mr. Montagu asked whether we were aiming at the benevolent
neutrality of Persia, or her active assistance—if the latter, it
must mean an alliance. He himself could not see the difference