Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎50r] (99/544)

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He reminded the Committee that we abused the Germans for dis
membering Russia, and yet it appeared we proposed to do some
thing of the same sort ourselves.
The Chairman said that in the complete collapse ol Russian
rule in Central Asia the territory in question was at present no
man’s land.
Lord Hardinge said that the territory only a few years ago
had belonged to Afghanistan.
General Smuts suggested that it might be called a “ dis-
annexation,” and thought that perhaps the telegram to India
should raise the points made by General Wilson more specifically.
Mr. Montagu said that he had deliberately omitted the defi
nite points of General Wilson s note. As regards the question of
Russian territory, he wished to know whether our Government
were pro-Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik.
Mr. Balfour said that, if the best elements in the Russian
population asked us to assist them against the Germans, and
we then took a large.slice of Russian territory and handed it over
to Afghan sovereignty, after protesting we would never do this,
he thought it would be difficult for us to justify our action.
The Chairman thought we had been trying to do the same
thing in Siberia—it was pretty certain that if the Japanese went
into Siberia they would remain there.
Mr. Balfour did not agree. If, however, the Allies did not
go into Siberia at the same time as Japan, the latter country
might go in alone and say that she meant to stay.
The Chairman said that what we were trying to do was to
set up a Moslem nexus of States to stop the German and Turkish
advance. Was it, in the circumstances, wrong on our part to
encourage the Afghans to recover territory which had been filched
from them years ago?
Mr. Montagu suggested the point might be saved if it were
put in the form of a question, e.g., k ' as regards Afghanistan,
would it encourage the Amir, &c., &c.”?
Mr. Balfour said the view of his department was that the
proposed policy could not be allowed to mature until the whole
Russian question had been reviewed. No doubt Russia had no
right to Penjdeh. He thought it impossible to accompany a great
movement towards rehabilitating states, which had suffered in the
war, with such an appropriation of territory. Moreover, he was
not very happy about a suggestion that had been made as to a
temporary military occupation of Penjdeh. He thought we could
hardly ask the Afghans to go there and then to relinquish it.
The Chairman reminded the Committee that we were already
proposing to destroy Russian property, i.e., the Trans-Caspian
Railway. Further, it would not be we who would occupy Russian
territory, but the Afghans.
The Committee decided:
''a.) To ask Mr. Montagu to re-draft his telegram, and to
submit it to the Chairman, 'putting the reference to
Afghanistan in the form of a question.
(b.) Thai the telegram should go in three parts, one of which
should deal with the sphere of control to be allotted to
India, a second with A fghanistan, and a third with
Missions.
3. Mr. Montagu said that he could put his proposal in a very
few words. On the cne hand, if Persia was to be regarded as
hostile to us, our policy there, from a military point of view, was
not strong and active enough. On the other, it was too active if
we were to have any chance of getting Persia to come in as an ally.
As our man-power position was weak, he suggested that we should
oet Persia on out 1 side in order to reduce our military commitments
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