Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎49v] (98/544)

The Chairman said that there were proposals to send mis
sions to Central Asia, Trans-Caspia, to Bokhara (which was quite
a different proposition), Russian Turkestan, and Chinese Tur
kestan. Just at the time we proposed to invite the Amir to come
in on our side, it was proposed to send a mission to Bokhara
before the Amir had time to make up his mind about our sugges-
tion.
Lord Hardinge suggested that the Meshed Mission might be
instructed to move in a westerly direction into Turkoman country,
in order to prepare for the destruction of the railway, which was
their main object.
The Chairman pointed out that this was not India's idea.
They wanted the mission to move east to Bokhara, and eventually
to Tashkent.
General Macdonogh explained that the original idea was to
send a mission to Meshed corresponding to Dunsterville’s mission
to Tiflis, to work up the friendly elements in Transcaspia. Now,
besides the destruction of the railway, we very much needed
(a) information about the Orenburg—Tashkent railway; (b)
information about the Austrian and German prisoners—whether
they were being armed, &c.
The Chairman said that he was apprehensive of anything
which touched the borders of Afghanistan, and he was afraid that
the mission might drift into negotiations wdth Bokhara and
Khiva. As, however, w'e had handed over the whole of this area
to India, we must give the Indian Government the opportunity
of reconsidering their views.
Mr. Montagu invited the Committee to refer to the following
words which occurred on the second page of General Wilson’s
Memorandum:—
“ The Government of India are diffident about formulat
ing any definite course of action. Let the War Cabinet decide,
for such'diffidence is the highway to inaction and defeat.”
It was those words which had made him try to give a lead
to India.
The Chairman said the proposed policy was an alliance with
Afghanistan, and an indispensable feature of this policy was the
despatch of missions. We must, however, await the views of the
Indian Government, both on the policy and on the missions.
Mr. Balfour said he was inclined to agree, but it was more
an India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. than a Foreign Office question.
Lord Hardinge thought that it would be much easier to carry
out our policy in regard to Afghanistan if we first secured an
ally in Persia.
General Smuts enquired whether the Committee was to settle
the policy of India; or w^ere they merely to make suggestions and
to leave India to formulate its own policy?
The Chairman pointed out that the Viceroy of India and
his Government were in these matters advisers to the Home
Government, and that in the last resort it rested with the latter to
decide.
Mr. Montagu thought that the present position was some
what different, as it was proposed to give India the control of
military operations in that area.
Mr. Balfour said that the practice was that the Home
Government did not issue any instructions without first con
sulting India, just as India took no initiative without first
referring home.
Mr. Montagu suggested that he should re-draft the telegram,
and submit his draft to the Chairman.
Mr Balfour said that the proposal was to get the Amir in
on our side by promising him territory. He felt this to be a
rather ‘‘strong order," as the territory in question was Russian.