Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎14v] (28/544)

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peoples, he would probably not say more than that their true
interests should prevail as against exploitation by conquerors. If
so, an Arab State under British protection would satisfy him (and
with him the American public, though less enlightened)," if it were
shown that the Arabs could not stand alone. Doubtless the Arabs,
if offered the choice, would choose what we wished.
Sir Percy Cox pointed out that nothing in the nature of a
plebiscite could be arranged. It was quite unsuited to Arab
thought and habits, and coidd only excite the liveliest misgivings.
In view of American experience in the Philippines, and of the
practical impossibility of applying “self determination” to the
German colonies and to the Pacific Islands, it appeared to Mr. Balfour
unlikely that President Wilson would oppose the policy suggested.
As to the Sherif, our promises to him and his pretensions.
Sir Mark Sykes observed that Hussein claimed to be the Liberator
of the Arab peoples, who were federalists at heart; and that, if
called the Premier Arab Chief, he would be satisfied that he was
King of the Arab countries. Were he to receive a subsidy from
Iraq, any form of government there that had the consent of the
people and paid, him, should leave him no ground for complaint.
His connivance in Sir P. Cox’s proposed constitution of the new Arab
State of Iraq could be obtained by offering him the subsidy (without
one the Hejaz could not subsist), and recording his acknowledgment
as a form of consent. His consent, in some form or other should be
compassed. Sir Percy Cox questioned the necessity and advisability
of consulting the Sherif on the subject, and strongly deprecated it.
Sir Thomas Holderness raised the question of our Allies’ attitude
to our retention of this territory. Though France had agreed in
principle, there was scant prospect of her obtaining compensation in
another part of the Ottoman Empire. It was not improbable that
we might have to meet a demand in the Peace Conference for some
sort of international control.
Mr. Baliour remarked that it was a consequence of our
geographical position that we had done most of the conquering of
distant territory, and that this war might end like others in a map
of the world with more red on it. This result, however, might not
be ascribed in other countries to its geographical cause.
Lord Curzon expressed the opinion that international control
must be resisted, and that, if necessary, compensation elsewhere
must be found for our Allies. The problem had been considered
by the Imperial M ar Cabinet last 3 ’ear, and the Cameroons had
been mentioned in this connection.
With regard to the district of Basra, General Macdonogh
ggested that its limits should be extended to a line passing
through Nasirieh and north of Kurnah to the Persian frontier at
Hawizah. This would yield a defensible strategic frontier. It was
pointed out by Lord Hardinge that this line would apparently
involve the inclusion of Amara also.
The advisability of proclaiming the annexation of Basra and its
neighbourhood was then discussed. Should the word “ annexation ”
appear too inauspicious (as suggested by Sir Mark Sykes), the
C han man expiessed the hope that a terminological variant, such as
“ perpetual lease,” or “enclave,” might be found, both to safeguard
the reality which we must not abandon, and to save the appearances
which the occasion might require.
In conclusion—
The Committee approved Sir P. Cox’s Memorandum, and
desired him to proceed with the development of the
administration in Mesopotamia on the lines that had been
laid down.