Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎14r] (27/544)

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of the enemy; (b) a result of such a nature that peace on terms
might have to be negotiated with Turkey; (c) victory of the Allies.
The first of these it was not necessary to consider, for in that
case we should not be in a position to retain or administer anything
at all.
As to the second, Sir Percy Cox in his Memorandum had
considered the question of recognising a nominal Turkish suzerainty,
symbolised by the retention of a flag. As a last resort it might be
possible to reconcile this with a sound administration of the country.
The question of the flag could doubtless be settled, possibly on the
analogy of the Soudan.
In the third case the Turks would disappear altogether, and
we should construct a State with an “Arab Fa 9 ade,” ruled and
administered under British guidance and controlled by a native
Mohammedan, and, as far as possible, an Arab staff. How was such
a State to be set up ?
The choice of its titular head presented some difficulty, in
view of the assurances given by Sir H. McMahon to King Hussein,
assurances that were materially qualified at the time, but had never
been entirely withdrawn. (See India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Memorandum B. 281,
circulated as E.C.-76.)
Sir P. Cox had pointed out that Malik Hussein carried no
weight in Iraq, and suggested as titular head of the future State
the Naquib of Bagdad, who might be denominated Sultan or
Hakim. If, however, we were held to our pledge to the King of
the Hejaz we might satisfy the latter with a subsidy, paid from the
revenues of Iraq, by way of recognition of his spiritual primacy.
In such an administration the British Government would be
represented, as contemplated in the scheme drawn up after the
capture of Bagdad, by a High Commissioner resident at Bagdad,
working with a small body or Cabinet of Ministers, say half native
and half British, and assisted perhaps by an advisory body or
council of a dozen prominent and representative natives. This was,
of course, only a sketch of what might be done.
Such an administration, it appeared, could be evolved from the
present conditions, on the lines laid down by Sir Percy Cox, without
dislocation or any sudden reversal of established habits. Irrigation
and education should be the main lines of progress. Nomadic
tribes, even if untouched by these attractions, would find nothing to
resent in such a system, if it left them generally alone, and only
took toll of their flocks and herds when they entered the town
markets on which they were dependent for trade.
In view of the political and commercial interests involved, and
of the specific pledges that had been given to the people of Basra,
who had been told that we should not leave, it might be desirable
to keep Basra town and district entirely in British hands. This
district would extend from Fao at the mouth of the Shatt-eTArab,
20 miles from Basra, to Gurmat Ali, w r here the Euphrates joined,
10 miles higher, or possibly Kurnah. This area contained a
population of approximately 80,000, the vast majority being Arabs,
the remainder Jews, Indians, Syrians, Christians, Sabeans, &c.
Lord Islington asked whether the establishment and develop
ment of civilised institutions would not be so costly as to necessitate
a more burdensome taxation than the population was accustomed
to under Turkish rule.
Sir Percy Cox replied that at the beginning loans would
certainly be required, but that increased prosperity would rapidly
repay the greater fiscal requirements of government.
With respect to the policy of the “Arab Fayade,” and its
more or less specious inconsistency with the principle of “ self-
determination,” Mr. Balfour expressed the belief that President
Wilson did not seriously mean to apply his formula outside Europe.
He meant that no “ civilised ” communities should remain under the
heel of other “ civilised ” communities : as to politically inarticulate
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