Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎7r] (13/544)

3
Sir Mark Sykes undertook to write to him privately and try to
prevail on him to come to London and talk the matter over.
It was also agreed—
That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have a
memorandum prepared in the Foreign Office reviewing the
whole case.
Concerning the alleged intrigue of Faisal with the Turks, a
possible explanation was indicated by (general Macdonogh. Faisal’s
overtures might be intended to deceive the Turks and delay
their threatened advance on Tafileh until General Allenby had
pushed further on.
Sir Mark Sykes suggested that, as llritish forces had now
crossed the Jordan and were operating in an area unmortgaged by
any agreement, attractive offers of local authority might be made to
Faisal.
Ft was agreed—
That General Clayton’s opinion on this suggestion should be
obtained ; and, with a view to encouraging the Sherif’s
faith in us, it was decided that the Foreign Office should
send a full telegram to General Clayton explaining the
difficulties and asking his advice.
Military Move
ments in Central
Persia and
Bakhtiaristan.
4. The Committee had before them two telegrams from Sir C.
Marling (E.C.-4 and E.C.-16) answering the questions referred to
him in the last meeting of the Persia Committee.
The Chairman pointed out that both on the project of an
advance to Ispahan and on that of despatching General Dunster-
ville’s officers into Bakhtiaristan our representative in Tehran
expressed himself emphatically. He was opposed to both. He
considered that a move to Ispahan would not deter a coup de main
in Tehran, that it would alienate the Cossack division which was
our sole support there, and would probably antagonise the
Bakht iaris.
For the last-named he suggested more conciliatory methods
than the despatch of officers from General Dunsterville’s mission.
It was desirable that a fuller explanation of these methods than
appeared in telegram E.C.-16 should be obtained from Sir C.
Marling, against whose deliberate and strongly-worded advice it
would not be right to proceed.
x\ttention was drawn by Lord Hardinge to a telegram from
Sir P. Sykes, No. 255 (E.C.-3C). As this telegram had not been
seen by the other members of the Committee, copies were obtained
and circulated.
It appeared from this that Sir f\ Sykes differed from Sir C.
Marling on the expediency of occupying Ispahan.
It was generally agreed that the passage in this telegram, to
the effect that Ispahan could be occupied in one week after receipt
of orders, could not be depended on and must be considered a
cyphering error. At least four weeks would be required.
Further, it was pointed out that the crux of the situation was
not Central Persia, but Tehran, and that the opinion of our repre
sentative there, backed by that of the Government of India, must
outweigh that of an officer in South Persia (see telegram dated the
25th March, 1918, from Viceroy (E.C.-13), doubtless including
the views of the Commander-in-Chief in India). Having got to
Ispahan, we should probably have to push on to Kum, or even to
Tehran—in other words, to launch forth into military occupation of
the whole of Persia. This, apart from political considerations
affecting our relations with the Russians and with the Persians,
would involve a strain on the military resources of India, which
could not be undertaken lightly. 0;r agreed policy was to push